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"CORRUPTLY": WHY CORRUPT STATE OF MIND IS
AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR HOBBS ACT
EXTORTION UNDER COLOR. OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
Jeremy N. Gayed*
INTRODUCTION

Public officials of the thirteenth to late eighteenth century rightfully collected statutory dues and customary fees from the public to
supplement the insufficient income paid by the Crown. Predictably,
the mixture of official authority with pecuniary self-interest often resulted in abuse, with many officials taking greater fees than were rightfully appropriate. To combat this widespread corruption, England
developed a body of law for the punishment of improper takings by
public officials. Because these officials lived in a context of poor oversight while concurrently possessing a right to independently collect
revenue, the distinction between corrupt extortion and innocent fee
collection was murky. To help navigate the fog, common law courts
developed a doctrine of corrupt state of mind: public officials were
only guilty of extortion or bribery when they took with an unlawful
purpose, that is, when they knew that they were not due the amount
they received.'
Public officials of the modern American variety exist in a context
strikingly similar to medieval England. Elected public officials have a
right to receive campaign contributions from businesses and individuals that have an interest in their official conduct. The right to collect
campaign funds is complicated; although politicians may accept contributions from interested parties intending to influence their conduct, they may not accept bribes or extort. Oversight of campaign
finance is poor, and the murky lines between guilt and innocence
compose an intricate web of regulation that consists of internal ethical
guidelines, and extortion, bribery, and illegal gratuities statutes.
Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2004. My gratitude goes
to to Eric Tamashasky and Jason Stare for fruitful discussion and perspective and to
my wife Maija-Liisa, whose steadfast support upholds all my endeavors.
1 See infra notes 11-116 and accompanying text.
*
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Corruption by public officials is commonly prosecuted under the
Hobbs Act. 2 The Hobbs Act, which adopts common law extortion,
does not have a corrupt state of mind element on its face. Courts
interpreting the Act have overlooked that extortion at common law
required a corrupt state of mind, and have failed to read such a
mental element into the statute.
Nevertheless, courts have increasingly recognized that using the
Hobbs Act as an ethics-in-government statute presents problems both
of breadth and of differentiation, and have tried to mitigate these
problems through the imposition of various judicial modifications.
These glosses, primarily the quid pro quo standard from McCormick v.
United States3 and Evans v. United States,4 serve as imperfect substitutes
for a corrupt state of mind.5 Furthermore, courts have in some instances replaced the corrupt state of mind element on the face of the
bribery statute with a quid pro quo standard, thus leaving both wellmeaning politicians and victims of extortion susceptible to
prosecution.
Both formally and functionally, the soundest solution to these difficulties in applying the Hobbs Act is to rediscover the common law
corrupt state of mind requirement. Formally, reading a corrupt state
of mind into the Hobbs Act would comport with the general principle
of mens rea laid out in Morrisette v. United States.6 Functionally, by
instituting a corrupt state of mind requirement, the courts could escape the overbreadth problem created by the Hobbs Act's facial
scope, the underbreadth problem created by the Supreme Court's interpretational demand for a quid pro quo, and the problems of differentiation that plague this insolubly murky area of law. Perhaps most
importantly, a corrupt state-of-mind requirement could save both innocent politicians and well-intentioned victims of extortion from the
tribulation of federal prosecution.
2 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
3 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
4 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
5 See infia Part V.A. McCormick set out an explicit quid pro quo requirement that
is fundamentally underbroad. See McCornick, 500 U.S. at 271-74. Evans subsequently
replaced this standard with an implicit quid pro quo requirement that is fundamentally overbroad. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 268-69. The ideal solution, both formally and

functionally, is to abandon quid pro quo as an element in favor of a corrupt state of
mind requirement.
6 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (holding that when Congress creates criminal statutes

that cover common law crimes, the "absence of contrary direction [regarding requisite intent] may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a
departure from them").
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This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the common law
history of color-of-right extortion, focusing on the presence and definition of a corrupt state of mind in the crime. Part II introduces the
Hobbs Act and discusses the propriety of applying the common-law
corrupt state of mind requirement in light of the statute's history.
Part III continues this analysis in the context of the New York Penal
Code of 1865-the source of the color-of-right language in the Hobbs
Act. Part IV demonstrates the modern applicability of corrupt state of
mind through a case study of one modern federal case that "gets it
right ' 7 and another that gets it tragically wrong.8 Part V is a broader
survey of the Supreme Court and those circuits that have most relevantly addressed the issue. Part VI is a brief discussion of the differences between this Note and the seminal work in the history of
corruption-Judge John T. Noonan's Bribes.9
The whole of this Note uses the phrase "corrupt state of mind
requirement" and the term "corruptly" interchangeably, despite the
nonexistence of any formal legal state of mind requirements during
the bulk of the historical time discussed.' 0 These terms represent two
contentions: first, that corrupt state of mind was an element of bribery
and extortion at common law, and second, that corrupt state of mind
at common law meant that the defendant knew that his conduct was
unlawful.
I.

COMMON LAw HISTORY: FINDING AND DEFINING "CORRUPTLY"

Extortion and bribery are behaviors modern society considers
positively illegal and normatively wrong. Judge John T. Noonan suggests that the very word "bribe" first appeared in the English language
in Geoffrey Chaucer's The Canterbury Tales'I as "a metaphorical adaptation of the French briber, to eat greedily." 12 History, however, demonstrates that some level of reciprocity between rulers and ruled has

7
8

Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 1996).
United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
9 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984).
10 See infra note 18.
11 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Friar'sPrologueand Tale, in THE CANTERBURY TALES 220

11.1350-52 (N.F. Blake ed. 1980) ("This somnour euere waityng on his pray, / For to
somne an old wydewe, a ribibe, / Feynynge a cause for he wolde brybd'.... (emphasis
added)).

12

NOONAN,

supra note 9, at 747 n.63; see also 2

OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY 536

(2d ed. 1989) (attributing the first known English use of "bribe" to Chaucer).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

been the norm rather than the exception in many times and t*laces. 13Over the last few centuries, Western society has broken from the globally shared cultural norm of reciprocity, and reached a consensus in
law about the impropriety of private takings by public officials.' 4 It is

to this uniquely Western history, particularly the history of England,
that this Note turns.
It would seem odd if such pedigreed' 5 laws as those prohibiting
extortion and bribery had survived for centuries without answers to
questions covering the scope of their prohibition and their requisite
state of mind. Indeed, such is not the case. The common law history
of extortion and bribery demonstrates that, from their inception until
the end of the eighteenth century, these crimes had a uniformly accepted scope and state of mind, embodied in the word "corruptly."
According to Morrisetle, "Where Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries
of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word ....,,16 Part of the "cluster of
ideas" historically attached to the "borrowed word" extortion is a cor13 See NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3 ("Reciprocity is in any society a rule of life, and
in some societies at least it is the rule of life."); see also infra note 375 (discussing the
historical and cultural ubiquity of reciprocity).
Presumably, the modern conception of reciprocity is based at least in part on a
shared commitment to the modern state's conception of the rule of law. This, however, is not necessarily the case:
[T]he modern state is not the only effective form of rule: organized crime,
for example, functions quite well under different rules. The Mafia that protects and exploits Italian immigrants in some American cities and immigrant
workers in France performs a "public" function. It administers justice in an
immigrant population and, relying on ethnic solidarity, protects it from a
hostile society. It must serve its community well or risk losing credibility; by
serving the interests of its clients, it rules paternally, and it is particularly
assiduous in this because otherwise it could never extort money from the
immigrants it is supposed to protect. Whoever protects controls, and whoever
controls pillages.
I A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: FROM PAGAN ROME ro BYZANTIUM 96-97 (Paul Veyne
ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1987) [hereinafter HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE] (emphasis added).
14 "The honest functionary is a peculiarity of modern Western nations." Id. at 97;
see also NOONAN, supra note 9, passim.
15 The Statute of Westminster 1,1275, 3 Edw., c. 26 (Eng.), was the earliest statutory prohibition against extortion and bribery. At common law, extortion and bribery
were not well-distinguished crimes. SeeJames Lindgren, The Elusive DistinctionBetween

Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L.REV. 815 passim

(1988).
16 Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). In Evans, the Supreme
Court indicated the relevance of English common law to the Hobbs Act by citing
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rupt state of mind. Including this state of mind in the Hobbs Act
would not only be formally correct under Morrisette, but would also
functionally help to clear much of the smoke of modern judicial confusion in this area while providing the foundation for an effective and
principled boundary to federal extortion.
Despite its grounding in the common law, the modern judiciary
frequently treats "corruptly" as a vestigial appendage to the statutes in
which it is found. 17 Corrupt state of mind is not, however, one of
many largely inconsequential inconsistencies inevitable in a legal
structure that grows organically rather than systemically. It is instead a
term of art capable of principled meaning and application. This Part
will discuss the relevant history by: (1) establishing the proper historical background, (2) demonstrating that corrupt state of mind was an
element of extortion at common law, and (3) drawing a definition of
"corruptly" from common law cases and treatises.
A.

HistoricalContext

At common law, the corrupt state of mind requirement possessed
remarkable versatility.18 First, the corrupt state of mind element automatically adjusted itself to the particular case and officer. To act corruptly, an official had to violate the customs and laws pertaining to his
particular office knowingly, that is, he had to act with a subjective unlawful purpose. By requiring both knowledge of fact and knowledge
of law, 19 the corrupt state of mind requirement allowed the law sufficient delicacy to draw principled legal boundaries between legitimate
and illegal behavior in a complex system where (much like American
legislators) public officials were paid by both Crown and countrymen.
several English cases, the earliest of which was decided in 1298 A.D. Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 271 n.23 (1992).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 144 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002) (using a
quid pro quo test to display corrupt state of mind in federal bribery under 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (2000)).
18 One important consideration to keep in mind is that the term mens rea may
be only loosely applied to pre-nineteenth century case law. Formal requirements of
intent did not gain ascendancy in the law until sometime after 1770, near the time
where this historical analysis ends. SeeJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 205-06 (4th
ed. 2000).
When this Note speaks of intent in the historical context, it refers not to a formal
element of a crime, but rather to whatever mental state the courts generally understood to be necessary to the crime's commission.
19 This "knowledge of law" on the part did not have to be actual knowledge of
statutory law. Many of the fees collected by public officials were in amounts dictated
by custom. Knowingly exceeding the customary fee would have been as corrupt as
knowingly violating a positive legal boundary on fee collection.

17,36
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In a system lacking well-defined rules about what public officials may
take or request, a state of mind element capable of so differentiating
between licit and illicit conduct was a necessary lubricant to the
wheels of governmental process. Second, the corrupt state of mind
element limited the scope of extortion and bribery in a principled
manner by exempting subjectively innocent actors from liability. Corrupt state of mind remained the guidepost to extortion and bribery
law until the beginning of the nineteenth century, where history
shows that the corrupt state of mind element became somehow lost to
2
the common law. 11

20 That corrupt state of mind became lost as a dominant principle in the common law is evident. See, e.g., Field Code, ch. 15, § 613, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 220 (1865)
[hereinafter Field Code]. The Field Code cites People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1827), as its principle color of right extortion case. Field Code, supra, at § 613
cmt. VWaley required a corrupt state of mind for color of right extortion. Whaley, 6
Cow. at 663-64. Despite its reliance on Wialey, the Field Code codifies color of right
extortion as a strict liability crime.
A partial explanation of "corruptly's" lost status may inhere in the historical
movement towards codification. Codifications of the common law that did not include an express corrupt state of mind element, such as the Field Code, may have
obscured the common law definition of color of right extortion. One logical consequence of this theory would be that the federal government, which relied on the Field
Code in drafting the Hobbs Act, might suffer a more acute ignorance of corrupt intent than the states; and such is in fact the current state of affairs. See inira,Part III;
see also Cleavland v. State, 34 Ala. 254, 254 (1859) (deciding that a state statute punishing any taking by a public official, even though it did not have an intent element,
could not reach an official with "the bona-fide belief that the services had been rendered, and that the fee was legally due. . . . [A deliberate violation of known law]
constitutes the corrupt intent which is the essence of the offense."); Hood v. State,
245 S.W. 176, 176 (Ark. 1922) (reversing a conviction for extortion because "the indictment fails to charge appellant with having received the warrant corruptly and
under color of office. These [charges] are essential elements of extortion"); People v.
Clark, 151 N.E. 631, 636 (N.Y. 1926) (stating that, although illegal takings statute of
the charge did not contain an intent element, "[t]here can be no intent to do the
prohibited act unless the defendant knows that he is asking or receiving some reward
which is illegal"); State v. Pritchard, 12 S.E. 50, 51 (N.C. 1890) (asserting that "in
order to prove [extortion] it is necessary to show that the fees were demanded willfully and corruptly, and not through any mistake of law or fact"); Haynes v. Hall, 37
Vt. 20, 22 (1864) (holding that, to violate a state statute punishing the taking of illegal
fees, "it is necessary that the officer receiving such fees should do it with a knowledge
of the illegality of the act to constitute it an offense, subjecting him to the penalty").
But see State v. Dickens, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 406, 407 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796) (holding that "every officer is bound to know what the law is upon the subject of fees to be
taken by himself. He cannot excuse himself from taking more than the legal fee by
[claiming good faith]."); Lewis v. State, 64 S.W.2d 972, 974-96 (Tex. Crim. App.
1933) (holding that, where the statute is clear, a good faith mistake of law is no defense to color of right extortion).
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At common law, extortion was the earliest and broadest formulation of the law against corruption.2 1 Proscriptions against corrupt behavior first gained prominence in the Statute of Westminster I in
1275.22 Understanding the history of corrupt state of mind requires a
brief explanation of English social and political history between the
thirteenth and late eighteenth centuries.
Public officials of the time, particularly the sheriff, carried a
broad range of powers, and such officials were only loosely accountable to any central authority. 23 Dr. Austin Poole noted:
The chief agent of the Crown in local government was the sheriff.
...He was at the head of the fiscal, judicial, administrative, and
military organization of the shire. He was responsible for the revenues due from the shire, for which he was accounted twice a year at
Easter and Michaelmas at the exchequer; to him were the king's
writs addressed, and it was his duty to execute the king's instructions .... 24
The sheriff was accompanied in his administration of local affairs by a
host of other officials, including coroners, jailers, bailiffs, and justices
25
of the peace.
Although the sheriff exercised a wide variety of judicial, administrative, and law-enforcement responsibilities, Frederic William
Maitland defined the office in terms of one primary economic duty:
"the profits of the market and court seem to have been farmed [collected yearly by the King in round sums] ....

The farmer seems to

have been the sheriff .... "26 Although the sheriff was revenue collector, administrator, and law enforcer for the king, he received little or
no compensation from the crown for his duties. The sheriffs (and
27
other public officials) lived on fees collected from those they served.
Sir William Holdsworth noted that "certain of the officials of the local
government were paid indirectly by fees exacted for certain activities-the clerk of the peace, the sheriffs, the justices of the peace...
21

See supra note 15.

Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw., c. 26 (Eng.); see also 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 290 (4th ed. 1936).
22
23

See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 24-25.

24

AUSTIN LANE POOLE, FROM DOMESDAY BOOK TO MACNA CARTA:

1087-1216, at

387 (1951).
25 See id. at 389-92.
26

FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,

DOMESDAY

BOOK AND BEYOND: THREE ESSAYS IN

204 (1907).
27 See 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 24-27;
POOLE, supra note 24, at 387.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLAND

MAITLAND,

supra note 26, at 204;
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and the coroners, were paid in this way." 28 Administrative officials
were not alone in living on payments from their constituents; judges
also charged fees to those they served. 29 Holdsworth commented that
the "royal officials, even the judges, were both poorly and irregularly
1
paid [by the Crown]."""
The fees collected by public officials were generally fixed-some
by law, and others by custom."1 In fact, the law of the time held many
civilians (particularly those whose position implied a fiduciary trust
subject to abuse or marketeering, such as millers,3 2 ferrymen,'33 and
ecclesial officers3 4) legally liable as public officials under charges of
extortion for exceeding customary rates and charges, despite the fact
that these civilians were not employed by the Crown.3 5
Although sheriffs and other public officials received poor salaries
and were legally limited in their capacity to charge the public for their
services, "[t]he office of sherrif was evidently a lucrative one. Men
were prepared to pay a high price to be appointed. 3' - 6 The source of
the sheriffs' revenue, and for that matter the revenue of the coroners,
judges, jailers, and other public officials, was a blatant and widespread
disregard for legal and customary limits on their fees.17 Holdsworth
noted the "widespread corruption of the constantly increasing tribe of
royal officials,"3 8 and Poole asserted "that [the sheriffs] were often ra28
29

30
31

10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 153.
1 id.at 255.
2 id. at 294.
Statutes such as 1586, 29 Eliz., c. 4-5 (Eng.) list with explicit detail the rates

and fees the named public officials were bound to follow in the administration of
their duties. Many fees were not listed by any statute, but were instead fixed as a
matter of custom venerated enough to carry the force of law. See I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME

1,at 183 (2d ed. 1952) ("The unenacted part-and this is the great bulkof the law seems to be conceived as custom (consuetudo)."). St. Thomas More remarked upon the static nature of the feudal economic system, commenting that "even
OF EDWARD

if the number of sheep should increase greatly, their price will not fall a penny."
THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 20 (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1516).
32 Rex. v. Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1694).
33 Rex. v. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693).
34 Lake's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 677 (K.B. 1591).
35 Two cases particularly support this point. In Roberts, a ferryman was convicted
of extortion for accepting double the customary ferry rate. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. at
286. In Wadsworth, the court similarly convicted a miller of extortion for exceeding
the customary rates Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. at 489.
36 POOLE, supra note 24, at 388.
37 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 294.
38 2 Id.
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pacious and oppressive .... ,,39 A testament to the thoroughness of
corruption by public officials, particularly the sheriffs, lies in the creation of the office of coroner. Diana E.S. Dunn documented:
The office of coroner was established in 1194. Shrieval corruption
had long been a problem to the Crown, depriving it of much potential revenue, and royal finances were in a particularly parlous state
at this time because of the enormous ransom which had been demanded for the release of Richard 1, who was captured while on
crusade. The establishment of the office of coroner was intended to
act as a check on the activities of sheriffs and to ensure thatjudicial
revenue, such an important part of the king's income, reached his
coffers.

40

The history of extortion under color of official right is best understood against the backdrop of this complex interaction of weak central
regulation, unsalaried and fee-reliant public officials, and custom.
This complex system was the background for all of the law against
corruption, particularly that proscribing extortion and bribery. From
the time of the Statute of Westminster I in 1275 to the end of the
eighteenth century, there was no meaningful distinction between the
state of mind elements for these two crimes. 41 Bribes (unlawful tak44
ings by judges 42 or voters,4 3 or the sale of unsaleable public offices )
and extortions (takings by ecclesial officers 4 5 or administrative officials 4 6 under color of right) were considered similarly corrupt, 47 and
required the same corrupt state of mind under the law. Accordingly,
this Note treats extortion, bribery, and oppression 48 interchangeably
39

POOLE,

40

DIANA

supra note 24, at 387.
E.S. DUNN, COURTS, COUNTIES

AND THE CAPITAL IN THE LATER MIDDLE

(1996).
41 See generally Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824-25 (arguing that proscriptions
against corruption were designed to punish improper takings by public officials without making any meaningful distinction between whether those takings were "extortion" or "bribery").
42 See, e.g., The Mayor of Lynns Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1586).
43 See, e.g., Bush v. Ralling, 96 Eng. Rep. 883 (K.B. 1756); Rex v. Plympton, 92
Eng. Rep. 397 (K.B. 1724); Rex v. Mayor of Tiverton, 88 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B. 1723).
44 See, e.g., Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308 (K.B. 1769); Stockwell v. North, 74
Eng. Rep. 1068 (K.B. 1669).
45 See, e.g., Rex v. Loggen, 93 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1797); Rex v. Eyres, 82 Eng.
Rep. 1123 (K.B. 1667).
46 See, e.g., Longvills Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1665); Dive v. Maningham, 75
Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
47 See Lindgren, supra note 15, at 837-82; see also 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22,
at 564-74.
48 Courts typically used the word oppression to describe fear or force extortion,
but occasionally used it as a synonym for extortion tinder color of official right. See
AGES 95
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for the purpose of defining the corrupt state of mind element at common law.
B.

The Presence of "Corruptly" in Common-Law Extortion

Examination of the case law reveals a surprisingly consistent
agreement across centuries about what mental state imputed guilt for
extortion and bribery, that is, what constituted a "corrupt" mind.
That this common thread is often implied in the text rather than expressly stated is of little moment, particularly because formal state-ofmind requirements were not dominant features of the law of the
time. 49 Further, the idea of a corrupt mind was likely well enough
understood at the time to require little discussion. Despite a dearth of
direct treatment of the corrupt state of mind at common law, an ostensive definition of corruptly is possible through analysis of the facts,
holdings, and dicta of common law materials. 51 1 Ostensive definition
is arguably the more appropriate way to define an element of a com5
mon-law crime. '
Extortion and bribery were virtually indistinguishable commonlaw crimes, and bribery at common law expressly required a corrupt
state of mind. 52 This state of mind is suggested in the 1762 case Rex v.
Williams,5 3 where justices of the peace who withheld alehouse licenses

as a retribution for the plaintiffs' refusal to vote for them were tried
for extortion, even though improper attempts to influence voters
An Act to Prevent Occasional Freemen From Voting at Elections of Members to Serve
in Parliament For Cities and Boroughs, 1763, 3 Geo. 3, c. 15 (Eng.) (typifying color of
right extortive behavior as "extortion, injustice, and oppression"); see also Stockwel4 74
Eng. Rep. at 1068 (finding the Sheriff of Nottingham's unlawful sale of the offices of
jailer and bailywick a "corruption, and a great cause of oppression"). For the purposes of this Note, oppression will be subsumed under the broader category of extortion as it was at common law.
49

See supra note 18.

50 Connotative definition clarifies word meaning by substituting synonyms in the
manner of a dictionary. Ostensive definition describes by example. For instance, the
connotative definition of a sphere would be "the three dimensional shape described
by the movement of one point a fixed distance from another stationary point." By
contrast, an ostensive definition of a sphere might involve finding a well-fonned marble, and indicating that a sphere is something like this.
51

G. Robert Blakey, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudenceof the Federal Criminal

Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, app. A.
52 Bush v. Ralling, 96 Eng. Rep. 883, 883-84 (K.B. 1756) (characterizing bribery
as the corruption of a public official); see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1) (2000) (requiring
a finding of corrupt intent for bribery by public officials).
53 97 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1762).

2003]
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were more commonly typified as bribery. 54 Further, the court expressly found that the justices proceeded "from a corrupt motive,"
that is, an unlawful purpose; further, this finding was necessary to the
55
conviction.
In the 1740 case Rex v. Seymour and Others,56 three justices of the
peace were convicted (but not under the aforementioned statute) of
extortion for requiring foreigners to pay ten shillings for a license to
run an alehouse, when one shilling was the customary amount. 5 7 The
defendant justices' guilt for extortion hinged upon their demand for
a payment to which they knew they were unentitled.58 Once again, purposeful impropriety beyond the act of taking played an important role
in the determination of guilt. Rex v. Young and Pitts, Esq.,5 9 falling
chronologically between Seymour and Williams, was decided in 1758.
In Young, two justices of the peace were charged with oppression for
refusing to grant an alehouse license to one Henry Day. 61 The court
held that the justices could not be subjected to an information unless
"partiality, corruption, or malice shall clearly appear. ' 61 As demon-

strated by the following passage, the court's determination of criminality hinged on the justices' state of mind: "[i]f their judgment is
wrong, yet their heart and intention pure, God forbid that they should
be punished! . . .The present question therefore only is, whether

these gentlemen have been guilty of any partiality or malice (for corruption is not pretended,)

......62

The court was unwilling to find

guilt unless the judges had acted with an impure heart; or, in terms
more friendly to the modern legal imagination, an unlawful purpose.
Although Williams dealt with both behavior commonly considered extortion (improperly exercising power for profit by withholding
a license) and behavior commonly considered bribery (influencing
voters) at the same time, Young demonstrated that the same corrupt
state of mind requirement attached to an extortion charge divorced
from any charge of bribery. Further, the horror expressed in Young at
attributing guilt to one innocent in purpose suggests that the corrupt
54
Bush,
55
56

See, e.g., Rex v. Mayor of Tiverton, 88 Eng. Rep. 136, 136 (K.B. 1723); see also
96 Eng. Rep. at 883.
Williams, 97 Eng. Rep. at 851.
87 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1740).

57 Id. at 1305-06.
58 Id.at 1306.
59 97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).
60
61
62

Id. at 447.
Id. at 450.
Id.
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state of mind requirement wns a common and deeply held assumption
of the law.
In a large number of extortion cases, courts convicted public officials of extortive behavior with no reference at all to state of mind. 63
The existence of these cases does not challenge this Note's theory of
"corruptly," largely because the idea of "state of mind" as it is currently
conceived was not an ascendant concept in the law prior to the nineteenth century. 64 Rather these cases, by their generalized type, provide support for the theory. Viewed broadly, these cases all deal with
public officials who allegedly accepted, demanded, or took fees
greater than those set by statute or custom. Many of the cases contain
nothing but a bare description of facts and the holding, but all the
cases contain two common elements: (1) a fee was taken, and (2) the
taker knew that the amount taken was inappropriate. The bulk of
cases that convicted public officers of corruption without discussing
state of mind concerned public officers or quasi-officers that violated
a customary, rather than a statutory fee. 65 Because custom is by nature a practice of which all members of the society are aware, 66 argument over whether or not a particular defendant knew that he was
violating the customs associated with his office would have served little
purpose for the litigants or the court; given the definitional prevalence of custom, discussion of the defendant's knowledge thereof
would likely have proven irrelevant or futile. As a result, the defendant's state of mind in such cases commonly remained undiscussed.
Many such cases include no discussion beyond bare facts describing
63 See, e.g., Miller v. Aris, 170 Eng. Rep. 598 (N.P. 1800); Hescott's Case, 91 Eng.
Rep. 291 (K.B. 1795); Stotesbury v. Smith, 97 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1760); Williams v.
Lyons, 88 Eng. Rep. 138 (K.B. 1724); Rex v. Colvin, 88 Eng. Rep. 162 (K.B. 1723); Rex
v. Tracy, 87 Eng. Rep. 795 (K.B. 1704); Rex v. Wadsworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.
1694); Rex v. Roberts, 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693); Anonymus, 87 Eng. Rep. 162
(K.B. 1688); Rex v. Broughton, 83 Eng. Rep. 455 (K-B. 1673); Troy, an Attorney, 88
Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1669); Stockwell v. North, 74 Eng. Rep. 1669 (K.B. 1669); Rex v.
Eyres, 82 Eng. Rep. 1123 (K.B. 1667); Badow v. Salter, 82 Eng. Rep. 34 (K.B. 1625);
Empson v. Bathurst, 123 Eng. Rep. 1095 (C.P. 1622); Beawfage's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1076 (K.B. 1600); Dive v. Maningham, 75 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
64 See supra note 18 (noting the historical development of intent as a concept in
the law).
65 See An Act to Prevent Occasional Freemen From Voting at Elections of Members to Serve in Parliament for Cities and Boroughs, 1763, 3 Geo. 3, c. 15 (Eng.).
66 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, custom in the sense used here
means "[a] n established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a
law or right .. "4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 167. In instances
where an alleged extortioner demanded more than a customary fee, his knowledge of
the custom would likely be presumed due to the prevalence of knowledge inherent in
the idea of custom.
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the conduct and a verdict.6 7 Cases dealing with customary fees often
extended the class of liability beyond public officials to include some
civilians, whose fiduciary positions were bounded by customary fees
such as millers, ferrymen, and the clergy. 68 Far from undermining the
existence or meaning of the corrupt state of mind requirement, these
"intentless" cases serve only to emphasize the ubiquity of societal customs and the lack of a formal conception of state of mind.
Some of the cases where state of mind and knowledge were not at
issue were predicated upon the violation of statutory rather than customary fee limits. Statutory convictions tended to generate more state
of mind related discussions than custom-based cases did, indicating
that such discussion was less relevant to custom cases (where a defendant's knowledge of the "law" was circumstantially easy to infer as an
issue of fact) than it was to statutory conviction (where a defendant's
knowledge of the law was not circumstantially assured). In Beawfage's
Case,69 the court convicted a sheriff of improperly taking money from
a prisoner. Beawfage was tried under a statute that limited the sheriff
to collecting from someone only "to be a true prisoner or to pay for
his meat and drink .... -70 On its face, the statute had no state of
mind element. 7' Interpreting the statute, the court commented, "the
statute was made to avoid perjury, extortion, and oppression. 7 2z As a
matter of logic, the legal fees listed in the statute could not have
helped public officials to follow the law, nor could the statute itself
have prevented the listed crimes, unless knowledge of the statute had
a bearing on commission of the crime-that is, a corrupt state of
mind requirement.
Treatises interpreting the common law affirm the conclusion that
common law extortion had a corrupt state of mind element. John
Prentiss Bishop stated that "it is always held that extortion proceeds
only from a corrupt mind. '' 73 Wharton commented that "as to extortion at common law, and under most of the statutes, corrupt motive is
essential."' 74 Perkins and Boyce concurred, stating that "there is a special element which constitutes the mens-rea of the crime [extortion],
67 See supra note 63.
68 See supra notes 32-34.
69 77 Eng. Rep. 1076 (K.B. 1600).
70 23 Hen. 6 c., 10. (Eng.)
71 Id.
72 Beawfage's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1081.
73 2JOHN PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAw 328 (John M. Zane & Carl
Zollman eds., 9th ed. 1923).
74 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 1906 (12th ed. 1932) (emphasis added).
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and this is corruption. Because of this fact extortion is not committed
by the officer who innocently receives an unlawful fee as a result of an
honest mistake of fact or law."17 5 Clark and Marshall stated that to
"constitute extortion at common law, and very generally under the
' 76
statutes, there must be a corrupt intent.
Using extortion and bribery as our definitional bases for "corruptly," we now proceed to the ostensive process of defining corruptly.
One well-accepted definition of common-law extortion comes from
William Hawkins' A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown.77 Hawkins stated:
It is said, that extortion in a large sense signifies any oppression
under colour of right; but that in a strict sense it signifies the taking
of money by any officer, by colour of his office, either where none
at
78
all is due, or not so much is due, or where it is not yet due.
While Hawkins provided a functional definition of the actus reus of
extortion (with which a wide variety of legal scholars have agreed) ,79
75 ROLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 446-47 (3d ed. 1982)
(emphasis added).
76 WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES
795 (6th ed. 1958) (emphasis added).
77 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF TH-E PLEAS OF THE CROWN (8th ed. 1824).
78 1 id. at 418.
79 Hawkins's treatise, originally published 1716, is the first in a long line of treatises that support this Note's view of the corrupt state of mind requirement in color of
right extortion. Chronologically, these are 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141 (originally published 1769) ("[Elxtortion is an abuse of public justice, which consists in any
officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing

of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due."); 3JOsEPH
CHrIy, THE CRIMINAL LAw 293 n.(q) (1816) ("Where a statute annexes a fee to an
office, it will be extortion to take more than it specifies.... [but] [w]here nothing at
all is due, that fact ought to be averred, and where any thing was due, the sum that
ought to have been lawfully taken must be expressed."); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON rHIE CRIMINAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 2519 (7th ed. 1874) (originally
published 1846) ("Extortion, in its general sense, signifies any oppression by color of
right; but technically it may be defined to be the taking of money by an officer, by
reason of his office, either where none is due, or none is yet due."); CI.ARK & MARSHALL, supra note 76, at 794 (originally published 1863) ("Extortion is the obtaining
of the property of another, with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force or
fear or tinder the color of official right."); JAMES FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 112 (Frederick Sturge ed., 9th ed. 1950) (originally published 1877)
("If the illegal act consists in taking under the colour of office from any person any
money or valuable thing which is not due from him at the time when it is taken, the
offence is called 'extortion' . . . . Extortion, in its general sense, signifies any oppression by color of right; but technically it may be defined to be the taking of money by
an officer, by reason of his office, either where none is due, or none is yet due."); 2
EMLIN MCCLAIN, THE CRIMINAL LAw 129 (1897) ("The [extortion] indictment should
charge not only the taking of unlawful fees, but the facts showing the fees to be unlaw-
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he does not state a mens rea for the offense. Nevertheless, Hawkins
suggested a state of mind requirement when he later explicated that
"the chief danger of oppression is from officers being left at their liberty to set their own rates on their labour, and make their own demands; but there cannot be so much fear of these abuses while they
are restrained to known and stated fees." 80
Hawkins made two assumptions. First, Hawkins assumed that
laws against extortion were designed to curb abuse by requiring officials to adhere to "stated fees." Second, Hawkins assumed that to
commit extortion, the official must know that he is violating the stated
fees. While these implications alone may not comprise incontrovertible authority, their constant reaffirmation in the case law suggests
their correctness. Although Hawkins's extortion definition (and the
definitions of the long line of treatise writers that rely upon it) has no
express corrupt state of mind requirement, such a state of mind requirement was nevertheless assumed.8 1 Omitting "corruptly" altogether is a mistake unique to the modern law.
C.

The Meaning of Corruptly at Common Law

In Rex v. Clerk of the Peace of Cumberland,82 a judicial clerk was accused of taking "more than his just fee and due.

'8 3

While this was an

otherwise typical charge of color-of-right extortion, the opinion contained uncommonly useful commentary from the bench.

4

One of

the defendant's objections to the indictment was that the indictment
did not show with particularity how much the clerk took, how much
he was entitled to take, and his reason for taking more than he was
allowed. 8 5 Dissenting from the conviction, Justice Holt commented
that "[e]xtortion is a specific offence ...

he said he took ten shillings

more than his fee; why this may be, for perhaps he had another deful. It should state what was demanded and received, and ... what was due; and it
must be charged that what was received was for official services."); PERKINS & BOYCE ,
supra note 75, at 443 (characterizing conmmon law extortion as the corrupt collection
of an unlawful fee by an officer under color of office, "with no proof of threat, force,
or duress required" (quoting United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir.

1980))).
80
81
82
83
84
only a
85

1 HAWKINS, supra note 77, at 419 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
88 Eng. Rep. 908, 908 (K.B. 1706).
Id.
The majority of the cases from this period and area of the law generally record
bare record of the facts and the holding, with minimal discussion.
Cumberland, 88 Eng. Rep. at 909.
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mand upon him."' 3 Holt's dissent demonstrates that the required
mental state exceeded mere knowledge that the official was collecting
a fee. Holt implied that the clerk, to have a corrupt mind, needed to
not only intend his actions, he needed to understand the propriety of
his actions in light of the law. Holt dissented because the court
wanted to attribute guilt to a person whose unlawful purpose remained unproven.8 7 Ultimately, the law followed Holt's dissent instead of Cumberlands holding.
Following Holt both in time and in law, the court in Rex v. Gover-8 affirmed an extortion conviction because the defendant "color
officii extorsive injuriose he took money, and sheweth not for what
matter or cause."8 - The court indicated that, if the defendant had
been able to show cause (in other words, had proof of a lawful purpose), no conviction would lie. 11
The idea that the corrupt mind knows that it is violating the law is
further emphasized in Rex v. Vaughan.9 1 In Vaughan, the defendant
was convicted of bribegiving for offering to buy a clerkship at the Supreme Court of Jamaica. The court found that the defendant
Vaughan, when offering to buy the office from Duke Grafton, made
special arrangements that the dealings between himself and the Duke
remain secret. t2 Vaughan claimed in response that he believed the
office was saleable, and that the secrecy surrounding the sale was the
product of Duke Grafton's fears that the transaction was a political
trap."" The court convicted Vaughan of bribery, -4 and the centerpiece of its deliberation was whether or not Vaughan believed that the
office was saleable.9 5 The secrecy with which he undertook the transaction proved his undoing, as the court convicted him upon the reasoning that "all [the circumstances] prove that he himself looked
upon it as an unjustifiable transaction." 96
Vaughan's guilt hinged upon whether or not he believed that his
offer to buy the office was legitimate-not whether or not the office
86
87
88
89

90

Id. (Holt, J., dissenting).
Id. (Holt, J., dissenting).
83 Eng. Rep. 992, 992 (K.B. 1663).
Id.

d.

91
92
93

98 Eng. Rep. 308, 308 (K.B. 1769).
Id.
Id. at 309. Ironically, Duke Grafton's alleged fears would serve as circumstantial evidence that the sale was "corrupt"-that is, that both parties knew that the transaction was not entirely appropriate under the law.
94

Id. at 310-11.

95
96

See id. at 308-10.
Id. at 3 10.
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actually was saleable. This is a telling statement on the court's conception of "corruptly." Bribery and extortion required a special mental
state: the perpetrator had to know that his behavior contradicted custom or law. In the words of the Vaughan court, the perpetrator had to
9 7
know that he conducted an "unjustifiable transaction.."
The notion that a corrupt state of mind involves awareness of illegality is further supported in Rex v. Young and Pitts, Esq.9s Young provides a glance at conduct the courts were sure did not proceed from a
corrupt mind. In Young, the court admitted that "corruption is not
pretended" concerning the defendants' state of mind.9 9 The justices'
conduct (i.e., refusing to grant a license) was not extortion, regardless
of whether their decision was based on dislike, favoritism, or other
ignoble but legal uses of discretion. The court implied what manner
of mental state it would have found culpable when it asked, "why are
[the defendants] liable to be called to account . ..unless they act

faultily and willfully wrong?"' 0 0 Because the court required action
"faultily and willfully"" wrong for guilt, Young, like Cumberland and
Vaughan, must be read to hold that corrupt purpose is an unlawful
purpose, involving knowledge of both fact and law.
Not only did corrupt state of mind at common law involve both
knowledge of fact and knowledge of law, it involved knowledge of fact
and of particularlaw. Because every public official could collect a different set of legal and customary fees, the official could only be guilty
of extortion if the court found that he deliberately violated the fee
schedule attached to his particularoffice. Evidence for this proposition lies in the plain fact of existence of elaborate statutory fee
schemes for public officials that overlaid the pre-existing social customs. 10

2

The case law also bears out this interpretation. In Floyd and

St. Tho Cannon's Case,'0 3 the court declared that "if a man exihibiteth
against another man for extortion, there the sum certaine which he
did extort, must be laid out particularly in the bill." 10 4 Similarly, in
Lake's Case,'0 5 the court commented, "if no fee be due, the same
ought to appear in the judgment."'' 06 In Rex v. Tracy'07 the court re97
98

99
100
101

Id. (emphasis added).
97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).

Id. at 450.
Id. at 448.
Id.

102

Id.; see also 1586 29 Eliz. c. 4-5 (Eng.).

103

78 Eng. Rep. 257, 257 (K.B. 1628).

104

Id.

105

74 Eng. Rep. 677, 677 (K.B. 1591).

106

Id.
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fused to convict the defendant because the prosecution failed to show
that the defendant had taken anything to which he particularly was
unentitled.I"8 The court in Cumberland summarized the point well
when it declared "where there is a charge of extortion, it must be particularized."' 1 19 Extortion at common law, therefore, was an offense
particular to the legal limits of the office involved, and knowledge of
that law was an element of corrupt state of mind.
The court in Dive v. ManinghamI I" convicted a sheriff of extortion
for setting an unbailable prisoner free in return for an illegal fee. Discussing the nature of official right, the court commented, "this word
colore officii sui is always taken ... in malam partem, and signifies an
act badly done under the countenance of office . . .and is properly

called extortion." " Although the court made no direct reference to
Maningham's state of mind, the court's description of the crime shows
that, for guilt to attach, the taking must have been "in malam partem"
or have been "badly done."'1 2 The court, by its language, assumed
that the statute included a corrupt state of mind element.
In short, the case law ostensively defines "corruptly" as an unlawful purpose, that is, as the purpose to give, take, receive, or accept,
anything of value that is illegal or inappropriate to that particular office, knowing that it is illegal or inappropriate. "Corruptly" involves
both knowledge of fact (the defendant must know what he is accepting or taking) and knowledge of law (the defendant must know
that what he is accepting or taking is inappropriate to his office). The
treatises bear out this interpretation.
Wharton contended that corrupt behavior could only occur
"above all with knowledge that [the taking or receiving] was wrong
.... ,II" Clark and Marshall described corruptly as follows: "it is not

enough to show that unlawful fees were demanded and received, but
it must appear that they were demanded and received corruptly, and,
according to the better opinion, not under any mistake either of law
or fact.""14 Stephen followed this interpretation when he claimed that
"an illegal exercise of authority, caused by a mistake as to the law,
made in good faith, is not a misdemeanor [of extortion]."" 5 McClain
107

87 Eng. Rep. 795, 795 (K.B. 1703).

108

Id.

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Rex v. Clerk of the Peace of Cumberland, 88 Eng. Rep. 908, 908 (K.B. 1706).
75 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1550).
Id.at 108.
Id. (emphasis added).
2 WHARTON, supra note 79, § 2517.
C[.ARK & MARSHALL, supra note 76, at 795.
STEPHEN, supra note 79, at 112.
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concurred, adding: "[A] s to the intent, the statute should be limited
to cases where there is a purpose to extort, and it may be shown by
way of defense that the officer had grounds to believe and did believe
'1 16
that he was justified in taking the fees received."
The common thread amongst the treatise characterizations is
that to extort, a public officer had to be aware of his customary fees,
had willfully to obtain or accept some value, and also had to know that
the thing he obtained or accepted violated his appropriate official
dues. Thus, "corruptly" implicated both knowledge of fact and knowledge of the law. That the treatises even treat mistake of law as a defense to extortion-despite the general precept that ignorantia legis
neminem excusat-further supports this definition of corrupt state of
mind as embracing an unlawful purpose. Most tellingly, all of these
treatises follow Hawkins in defining extortion without an express cor17
rupt state of mind requirement.'

II.

THE

HOBBS ACT: AN INTRODUCTION AND A BRIEF HISTORY

A.

An Introduction to the Statutes

Three federal crimes are particularly relevant to corruption in
the context discussed by this Note:' I bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b), illegal gratuities, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c), and color of law extortion, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (b) (2). The bribery statute punishes whoever(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected
to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or
any person who has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official or person who has been
selected to be a public official to commit or aid in committing,
116
117

2 MCCLAIN, supra note 79, at 130.
See supra note 79.

118 The United States Code includes six types of conduct that do (or should, in
the case of the Hobbs Act) carry a corrupt state of mind requirement. They are:
bribery, governed by 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000); illegal gratuities, covered by 18

U.S.C. § 201(c); extortion, covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2); theft and embezzlement, covered by 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (B); obstruction of justice, covered by 18

U.S.C. § 1503(a); and obstuction of the Internal Revenue laws, covered by 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212. This Note primarily addresses color of right extortion, with some commentary on bribery and illegal gratuities. While the idea of corrupt state of mind advanced by this Note is also applicable to the statutes not expressly considered within

the Note, further discussion in this area would exceed this Note's scope.
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or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(C) to induce such public official or such person who has been
selected to be a public official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official or person;
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any
19
other person or entity ....
Section 201(b) (2), the portion of the statute that prohibits
bribetaking by public officials, punishes much of the same conduct as
color-of-right extortion. Moreover, bribery under § 201 (b) forbids
only the corrupt donation or receipt of gifts. Although the statutes
prohibit identical conduct, the color-of-right extortion provision of
the Hobbs Act has no corrupt state of mind requirement. Following
Parts of this Note will discuss in detail the importance of requiring a
corrupt state of mind to find guilt in an alleged extortioner (or, in this
case, bribetaker, for the same rationale applies to the bribery statute).
Over- and underbreadth are both serious dangers if a properly interpreted corrupt state of mind element is excluded or ignored.
Section 201 (b) bribery punishes acts of the bribegiver as well as
the bribetaker. If a public official can commit color-of-right extortion
and bribetaking for the exact same transaction, then a gift that is an
extortion when accepted by a public official is also a bribe when given.
Prosecutorial discretion, then, is all that separates a color-of-right extortion victim from a bribery defendant. Reading the Hobbs Act without a corrupt state of mind requirement embraces the Model Penal
Code's misguided belief that "corruptly" should be removed from the
bribery statute altogether so that those who give in to extortionate
threats can be punished.120 The solution to this conundrum is to adhere to the language already in the bribery statute and require that
the gift must be corrupt, that is, given with an unlawful purpose.
By contrast, the illegal gratuities statute punishes whoever
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of
value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by such public
119 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(1)-(2).
120 MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (1980) (stating that the corrupt state of mind
should be removed because it hinders the prosecution of the victims of color of right
extortion).
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official, former public official, or person selected to be a
public official; or
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because
of any official act performed or to be performed by such
official or person ....121
The primary differences between the illegal gratuities statute and
the bribery and extortion statutes are the lack of a corrupt state of
mind requirement and the punishment. The strict liability gratuities
statute carries a maximum punishment of only two years; by compari22
son, those convicted of bribery may serve five. 1
By further contrast, the Hobbs Act punishes anyone who
[O]bstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 123
The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
12 4
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
Since the bribery and extortion statutes apply to substantially similar conduct, 25 the most meaningful difference between the two
crimes is the facial presence of a state of mind element. While the
bribery statute requires that the exchange be made "corruptly," the
Hobbs Act has no state of mind attached to its color-ofLright language.
Formally, as demonstrated in Part I, a corrupt state of mind should be
read into the Hobbs Act. Functionally, a well-defined corrupt state of
mind is all that prevents these statutes from encompassing political
126
logrolling and much accepted campaign-finance activity.
121

18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (1).

122 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), with 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c). One further difference is
that of personality: § 201 (b) bribery can punish enterprises, while the illegal gratuities
statute inflicts only personal liability. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a).
123 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a).
124 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) (2).
125 See supra Part 1.
126 The Hobbs Act, on its face, encompasses any behavior that hinders interstate
commerce by threats, force, or extorsively under color of right. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (b) (2). Although the statute does not incorporate the word corruptly on its
face, this Note argues that a corrupt state of mind was required at common law as a
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The History of the Hobbs Act

Morissette holds that statutory words should be read in light of
their common-law meanings unless Congress otherwise instructs the
courts. 12 7 In the face of congressional silence regarding the requisite
state of mind for a common-law crime, the "[a] bsence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions,
not as a departure from them." 28 Whether the courts should read a
corrupt state of mind into the Hobbs Act in accordance with Morissette
therefore depends upon whether Congress: (1) adopted common-law
extortion; or (2) having adopted common-law extortion, specifically
intended to omit the common-law state of mind. The history of the
Hobbs Act immediately reveals two relevant facts. First, Congress
adopted common-law extortion when it enacted the Hobbs Act. Second, the focus of Congress and the Court was the control of racketeering activity, and corruption was an area on which Congress was silent.
The common-law meaning of extortion-that is, one including a corrupt state of mind-should therefore obtain.
The Hobbs Act was not the first congressional effort to control
racketeering, but was born as an amendment to the Anti-Racketeering
Act of 1934.12" The Act of 1934 was passed to "protect trade and commerce against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation."' 3'1 The 1934 Act, in relevant part, punished whoever
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or
threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or
other valuable considerations, or the purchase or rental of property
or protective services, not including, however, the payment of wages
by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of force or fear, or tinder color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or
physical injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to violate subsections (a) or (b) ....13 1
The occasion for drafting the Act is apparent in its "Anti-Racketeering" moniker. Although the statute was not originally contempractical necessity, and should be similarly included in modern federal jurisprudence.
See Lindgren, supra note 15, at 907.
127 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
128 Id.
129 Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979, repealed by
Hobbs Act, c. 645, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951

(2000)).
130
131

Id.
Id. § 2(a)-(c).
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plated as a corruption control device for public officials, the statute's
language embodies such an application.
In 1933, Senate Resolution 74 of the 73rd Congress authorized a
subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce to investigate racketeering activity. The subcommittee, eventually called the "Copeland
Committee" after its chair, New York Senator Royal S. Copeland, filed
an interim report claiming that more than ninety-two bills introduced
to the Senate between January and June of 1934 were "designed to
close gaps in existing federal laws and to render more difficult the
activities of predatory gangs of the Kelly and Dillinger types."' 1- 2 Senate Bill 2248, which would later become the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934, was among the bills described by Copeland as an effort to punish organized crime. 133 Attorney General Homer Cummings explained the bill in a letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Hatton W. Sumners: "the typical racketeering activities affecting interstate commerce are those in connection with price fixing
and economic extortion directed by professional gangsters."'1 34 Controlling political corruption was an unmentioned application of the
Act.
The debate surrounding the bill ignored the Act's potential impact on public officials to the extent that no questions were raised
about the "color-of-right" language in the debates or committee reports. Nowhere in the history of the Act of 1934 is there any indication that Congress recognized that the Act could be used to prosecute
political corruption, misuse of office, or political finance activity.
Instead, the debate surrounding the Act's passage focused mainly
on its potential impact on organized labor. In the letter to Congressman Sumners, Attorney General Cummings wrote,
The original bill was susceptible to the objection that it might include within its prohibition the legitimate and bona fide activities of
employers and employees. As the purpose of the legislation is not
to interfere with such legitimate activities but rather to set up severe
penalties for racketeering by violence, extortion, or coercion, which
affects interstate commerce, it seems advisable to definitely exclude
3
such legitimate activities. '

5

The power of the labor interest in the bill became apparent during
debate on the House floor. The following exchange between Con132
133

S. REP. No. 73-1440, at 1 (1934).
Id. at 2.

134

Letter from Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States, to Hat-

ton W. Sumners, U.S. Representative from Texas (May 18, 1934), reprintedin PETER W.
Low & JosEPH . HOFFMAN, FEDFRAL CRIMINAL LAw 268-69 (1997).
135

Id.
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gressman Oliver of New York and Congressman Schulte typified the
debate surrounding the bill:
MR. SCHULTE: I reserve the right to object, Mr. Speaker.
MR. OLIVER of New York: This is the noted racketeering bill recommended here and agreed upon by organized labor and by the
Department of Justice. It has been agreed upon by every factor involved in this kind of controversy. We have Mr. Green [President of
the American Federation of Labor] on recordMR. SCHULTE: Has the gentleman a letter from Mr. Green which
he states he is on record in favor of this bill?
MR. OLIVER of New York: Yes.
MR. SCHULTE: If so, I shall withdraw my objection, if the gentleman will show me the letter.
MR. OLIVER of New York: I cannot show the gentleman the letter,
but Mr. Green specifically agreed to it and it is stated in the report
that there is a letter from the Attorney General embodying the
agreementMR. SCHULTE: I do not care anything about the Attorney General.
MR. OLIVER of New York: And Mr. Green appeared before our
committee and stated before our committee that he intended to go
into a further conferenceMR. SCHULTE: Will the gentleman give me his assurance that he
has a letter from Mr. Green stating that he has agreed to this bill?
MR. OLIVER of New York: I will not say I have a letterMR. SCHULTE: Has the gentleman seen such a letter from Mr.
Green?
MR. OLIVER of New York: No; but I have seen an agreement in
36
which the Attorney General said that Mr. Green had agreed to it.1
Despite the potentially broad impact of the statutory text, Congress's overwhelming concern was how the Anti-Racketeering Act
would affect organized labor. No meaningful reflection or discussion
on how the bill might affect the members of Congress themselves
occurred.
The enacted language of the 1934 Act was tailored to except organized labor activities from the statute's purview.'- 7 Seven years after
the Act's passage, the Supreme Court considered its scope in United
136 78 CON-. REC. 10,867 (1934).
137 Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, § 2(a), 48 Stat. 979 ("not
including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona fide
employee").
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States v. Local 807.138 In Local 807, the Court upheld the Second Circuit's reversal of the convictions of several teamsters under the AntiRacketeering Act.' 3 9 The Local 807, whose membership included
most of the truck drivers in New York City, had been in the practice of
meeting non-member drivers and farmers driving to market near the
city limit, stopping their vehicles, forcing them to allow a union driver
to drive the truck into the city, and then requiring payment for the
service.1 40 In response to this outrageous behavior, federal prosecutors sought to punish members of the union under the Anti-Racketeering Act. 14' At issue was whether the hijacking non-member trucks
by union teamsters fell within "that portion of § 2(a) which excepts
from punishment any person who 'obtains or attempts to obtain, by
... threat to use force, violence or coercion.., the payment of wages
by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee."'"1 42 After surveying
the legislative history, the Court determined that Congress had intended to protect this kind of labor activity, and had "plainly attempted to distinguish militant labor activity from [racketeering] and
afford it ample protection."'14 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that, so long as the accused teamsters had a purpose to "obtain a
chance to work for a wage," they did not fall within the Act's
44
purview.1
The Court's construction of the Anti-Racketeering Act in Local
807was so controversial and unpopular that Congress drafted another
bill for the express purpose of overruling the decision.1 45 "To amend
the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against interference by violence threats, coercion, or intimidation,"' Congress
passed the Act eventually codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1951-the Hobbs
Act. 146 The differences between the Hobbs Act and the Anti-Racketeering Act are best understood in the context of the Hobbs Act's origin as a congressional response to Local 807. The debates
surrounding passage of the Hobbs Act concentrated solely on the its
potential application to labor: "There was much vilification of ... the
Local 807 case, but . . . in spite of their broad wording, almost no
138
139
140
141

315 U.S. 521 (1942).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 524-25.

142
143

Id. at 527 (quoting Anti-Racketeering Act § 2(a)).
Id. at 531.

144
145

PETER W. Low &JosEPii L. HOFFMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

146

Hobbs Act, c. 645, 60 Stat. 420 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

Id. at 534.

§ 1951 (2000)).

292 (1997).
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discussion of the possible application of the bill outside the labor context."' 147 The attitude surrounding the bill's passage was typified by
the following exchange from the first House debate on the bill:
MR. HALLECK: The celebrated 807 case in New York came on for

decision by the Supreme Court. The case involved the conduct of
individuals who stopped trucks going into the city of New York and
in effect hijacked the drivers ....
The Supreme Court held that
under the exception [in § 2(a)] the prosecution would not lie in
that case. I know a lot of good lawyers who violently disagree with
that decision, and personally I disagree with it ....
This bill seeks to supply the deficiency created by that decision.1

48

MR. HANCOCK: [This bill] covers the most heinous crimes the
criminal statute book contemplates. It had its origin in the activities
of the Dillinger gang. All the bill does is abolish the double standard which Justice Byrnes established [in 807] and makes labor responsible for crimes just as well as those who are not laborers. That
is all it does.
MR. CELLER: I wish the gentleman's interpretation were correct,
but I fear that he is woefully in error. This bill is primarily aimed at
labor. It has a label of racketeering, it has a label of extortion, it has
a label of robbery, but it is an antilabor bill. Let us not delude ourselves, because were it not for the so-called Teamsters' Local decision by Justice Byrnes, a labor decision, we would not have had this
bill. 149
The forgoing history demonstrates that the Hobbs Act was never
explicitly considered a weapon against political corruption. Predictably, given the lack of congressional guidance, the proper application
of the "color of official right" language is now a source of controversy
in the federal courts.150 Congressional silence is in this case convincing evidence that the prosecution of political corruption was not an
explicit goal of the Hobbs Act. Although it tests the imagination to
speculate that Congress would intentionally leave a self-applicable pro-

vision of law such as color-of-right extortion to unfettered judicial interpretation, they nevertheless did. The significance of this
conclusion is that the lack of a corrupt state of mind requirement on
the face of the statute was not a deliberate congressional command
regarding the elements of color-of-right extortion, because Congress
made no express commands regarding the use of the Hobbs Act as a
147

Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 145, at 298.

148
149
150

89 CONG. R.sc. 3192-93 (1943).
Id. at 3201.
See infra Parts tV-V.
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corruption control device. Rather, Congress never contemplated that
the Hobbs Act would be used to prosecute such conduct. In the light
of such congressional silence, the courts should give extortion its common-law meaning.

151

Interpreting the Hobbs Act's "color-of-right" language to comport with common-law meaning in light of congressional silence does
not therefore leave the "color-of-right" clause undefined. The lan15 2
guage of the Hobbs Act was taken whole cloth from the Field Code.
During the second House debate over the Act, Congressman Hobbs,
the Act's sponsor, declared that "[t] he definitions in this bill are copied from the New York Code substantially."' 53 United States v. Evans,
one of the few Supreme Court decisions to address color-of-right extortion, also noted that the Hobbs Act enacted Field Code extortion. 154 Because the Field Code codified the common law, Congress
by adopting it instituted a common-law extortion provision requiring
55
a corrupt state of mind.
III.

THE FIELD CODE

A.

The Code

The Field Code defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right."' 56 The Field Code's definition
of extortion is almost identical to the corresponding language in the
Hobbs Act extortion provision.' 5 7 The Field Code further recognizes
that, as at common law, color-of-right extortion differs substantially
from "fear and force" extortion. While the Field Code treated "fear
and force" extortion as a felony, it prescribed a different punishment
for extortion under color of right: "[e]very person who commits any
extortion under color of official right, in cases for which a different
151 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
152 See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (stating that the language of the Hobbs Act
was taken from the Field Code); see also Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
153

91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945).

154

504 U.S. 255, 261-62, 263 n.9 (1991).

155

See supra Part II.

156 Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
157 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2000) (defining extortion as "the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right"), with Field Code,
supra note 20, § 613 (defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,

with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official
right"). The two differ only slightly, and only regarding force and fear extortion. The
color-of-right provisions are identical.
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punishment is not prescribed by this Code or by some of the statutes
which it specifies as continuing in force, is guilty of a
58
misdemeanor." 1

Although the Field Code purportedly codifies common-law extortion, its definition omits a corrupt state of mind element. The reason
for the lack of a corrupt state of mind requirement may be explicable
by the Field Code's date of publication: 1865. The Field Code was
created and published well after the common-law definition of extortion had become muddied and corrupt state of mind as an effective
element of color-of-right extortion had become lost. That "corruptly"
as it related to color-of-right extortion was lost, however, does not preclude its validity as a part of the common law, or its adoption by the
Field Code and then the Hobbs Act.
Hints of the corrupt state of mind that should inhere in color-ofright extortion can nevertheless be found by analyzing the Field Code.
First, the Field Code deals with extortion under "Title XV: Of Crimes
Against Property."' 5 9 Under the Field Code's classification system, extortion's neighbors include arson, burglary, forgery, larceny, embezzlement, and false personation. 61 1 As would be expected with
16
common-law crimes, all of these carry a "specific intent." '

"Willful

malicious"'11 2

and
intent is required for arson; "intent to commit some
crime" 6 3 for burglary; "intent to defraud" 16 4 for forgery; "with fraud
or stealth, or without color of right thereto, and with the intent to
deprive another thereof"' 115 for larceny; "fraudulently"' 66 for embezzlement; and "falsely"'16 7 for false personation.
The grammatical situation of the intent within these crimes is telling. Four crimes include the disjunctive "or" in their elemental definitions: larceny, forgery, false personation, and extortion. The
larceny statute punishes "the taking of personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth, or without color of right thereto, and with
158

Field Code, supra note 20, § 616.

159

Id. at xlvii, 1.

160
161

Id. at xlvii.

162

Field Code, supra note 20, § 521.

163

Id. § 540.

164
165
166
167

Id. §§ 553-57.
Id. § 584.
Id. § 601.
Id. § 620.

KAPLAN EI'AL., supra note 18, at 207 (stating that all crimes for which common
law courts had defined an intent element require a 'specific' intent (citing 1 JOEL
PRENTISS BisioP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 229, 220-22 (Boston, Little &
Brown 1856))).
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intent to deprive another thereof."' 68 Each disjunct is given its own
intent element. Forgery, for example, punishes "[e]very person who,
with intent to defraud, forges, counterfeits or falsely alters."' 69 Here
the "or" is part of a list, all of whose components are covered by the
provision's intent clause. False personation has a similar setup containing an intent element that covers a disjunctive list of culpable con70
duct, although there the list is more lengthy.'
Although it also contains a disjunctive clause, the extortion provision has a slightly different structure. The Field Code, like the Hobbs
Act modeled upon it, defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right."' 71 The difference between the
"fear and force" extortion and "color-of-right" extortion is emphasized
in a footnote to the definition of larceny. The Field Code states, "in
extortion there is again a taking. Now it is with the consent of the
party injured; but this is a consent induced by threats, or under color
of official right."' 7 2 The "color-of-right" clause is clearly separated in
kind from the more familiar "wrongful use of force and fear" clause,
but, unlike the disjunctive clauses in other crimes' definitions, it is
neither graced with language of an independent intent, nor part of a
list included under a broader intent. Nonetheless, color-of-right extortion is a common law crime listed by the Field Code as a crime
against property, and as such its prosecution should require a "specific" state of mind. The inclusion of color-of-right extortion amongst
other property crimes hints at that which the Field Code does not
mention-that color-of-right extortion carries the "specific" state of
mind "corruptly."
B.

Corruption, Bribery, and Extortion: Definition and Comparison
within the Field Code

The Field Code, like Title 18 of the United States Code, facially
retains a corrupt state of mind requirement for bribery, but not for
extortion. Unlike the federal code, the Field Code has a working definition of "corruptly." The Field Code adequately (if somewhat narrowly) defines "corruptly" as "import[ing] a wrongful design to
acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person
168
169
170
171
Code
172

Id. § 584 (emphasis added).
Id. § 553 (emphasis added).
Id. § 620.
Id. § 613 (emphasis added); cf 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2000) (using the Field
language to define extortion under color of official right).
Field Code, supra note 20, § 584 cmt. (emphasis added).
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guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person."' 173
The Field Code rightly states that the heart of the corrupt state of
mind is a "wrongful design." Further, it is the design-that is, purpose-that is wrongful, not the mere conduct of acquisition.
Functionally, the structure of the Hobbs Act suggests that colorof-right extortion should carry a heightened state of mind element.
Federal bribery, which can arise from the same conduct as color-ofright extortion and itself carries a corrupt state of mind requirement,
carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years. 174 Color-of-right extortion
under the Hobbs Act, which on its face has no state of mind element,
carries a maximum penalty of twenty years.1 75 It is a well-recognized
principle of the criminal law that separate crimes covering similar conduct generally punish the more evil-meaning mind (that is, one with a
more specific purpose to commit a wrong) with the greater sentence.17 6 It makes little sense for two federal statutes covering much
of the same conduct to carry substantially different penalties when the
more harshlypunished conduct requires the lesser state of mind. The solution
to this apparent structural flaw is to read a corrupt state of mind requirement into color-of-right extortion, as at common law.
C. People v. Whaley
The Field Code's only cited case regarding color-of-right extortion is People v. VVhaley. 177 Further, the Supreme Court relied upon
Mhaley as precedent in both Evans 78 and McCormick.179 The Field
Code's omission of an express corrupt state of mind element is interesting in light of its use of Mhaley as a source, given that Mhaley expressly included ajury finding of corrupt state of mind as an essential
173
174

Id. § 765.
18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (4) (2000).

175

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

176 Punishment for the taking of human life, for example, may vary widely. "Murderers," or those who take life deliberately without excuse or justification, are punished more severely than "manslaughterers," those who commit the same conduct
with a lesser degree of intent. This example typifies the criminal law.

177

6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).

178 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 276 (1992) (using Whaley to rebutJustice
Scalia's dissenting claim (which itself relied on Wha/ey) that color-of-right extortion at
common law always involved false pretenses).
179 McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 279 (1991) (citing Whaey as the sole
pre-Hobbs Act New York prosecution of color of right extortion, in an attempt to
demonstrate the dearth of authority for the crime's definition). As Part I demonstrates, however, ample authority for the definition of color of right extortion exists if
research is extended but a little further back in time.
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element of the charge.18 0 The jury sitting in Whaley found guilt by
concluding that the defendant judge "received and demanded . ..
money by color of his office, and with the corrupt intent charged in the
indictment.'8 1 The opinion stated that "[t]hese facts being proved, the
[offense] was complete."' 82 In contrast to the Field Code and the Supreme Court jurisprudence that draw upon Whaley as precedent, the
Whaley itself included "corruptly" as an essential element to the
charge of extortion under color-of-right.
Furthermore, Whaley held that "[t] he questions of fact and [corrupt] intent were fairly submitted to the jury. It was their province to
judge of both ....,183 As corrupt intent was a question of fact for the
jury, Whaley strongly suggests that mistake of law was a defense to the
element of corrupt state of mind. If mistake of the law is a defense to
color-of-right extortion, then knowledge of the law must be an element of the corrupt state of mind. Uhaley's holding has the additional benefit of being correct in light of the common-law tradition.
The Hobbs Act drew its language and meaning from the Field
Code. The Field Code was a codification of the common law. Whaley,
the common-law opinion referenced by the Field Code, recognized
the longstanding common-law tradition of requiring a corrupt state of
mind for guilt, and therefore admitting a possible mistake of law defense in color-of-right extortion cases. Accordingly, courts should require that color-of-right extortion under the Hobbs Act be committed
''corruptly."

IV.

ALFISI AND ROMA:

A

CASE STUDY IN THE CONFUSION

OF THE MODERN COURTS

Recently, federal courts and reform bodies have struggled with
various stopgap measures designed to mitigate the potential reach of
the bribery and extortion statutes. One prominent discussion, addressed by the Supreme Court in McCormick v. United States,184 settled
in the affirmative a judicial debate over whether the Hobbs Act included a quid pro quo requirement for color-of-right extortion. The
quid pro quo requirement, however, serves as a pained and ill-fitting
180
181

Whaley, 6 Cow. at 664.
Id. (emphasis added).

182
183

Id.
Id.

184 500 U.S. 527 (1991) (asserting that color-of-right extortion could not be found
absent a finding of quid pro quo).
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effort by the Court to recover the utility of a properly defined corrupt
18 5
state of mind requirement.

Another band-aid, this one applied to bribery by the American
Law Institute (ALI), is found in the Model Penal Code's recommendation (adopted in several states) 186 that the "corruptly" language be removed from bribery statutes altogether because "the requirement of
'corrupt' purpose provides virtually no guidance as to the intended
scope of the law of bribery."' 8 7 Despite the ALI's argument to the
contrary, purging the law of "corruptly" has resulted not in greater
clarity, but rather in deeper confusion.1 8
A case contrast between proper and improper conceptions of corrupt state of mind as it relates to extortion and bribery will serve as a
useful to guide to inform a broader survey of the federal courts. In
Roma Construction Co. v. aRusso,18 9 the First Circuit correctly captured
the proper role of corrupt state of mind. In Roma, Peter Zanni and
Roma Construction Company entered into a real estate development
venture. 91° Unbeknownst to them, their partners in the venture had
made a deal with the "de facto government of the Town" in which
cash would be exchanged for necessary approvals. 9 1 Eventually, the
partners departed and Roma and Zanni were informed of the preexisting deal and asked to pay up. 192 Faced with a choice between capitulating to the extortionate demand or losing their multimillion dollar
investment, Roma and Zanni decided to pay. 193 Three years later, after Zanni succeeded in selling his shares of the venture, he contacted
185 See infra Part V.A.
186 The Model Penal Code lists Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virgina as following their 'corruptless' approach. MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1
cmt. n.10 (1980).
187 Id. § 240.1 cmt.
188 This Note contends that Roma Construction v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566 (lst Cir.
1996) is a solid example of a well-decided case in this area. Roma was decided Linder
Rhode Island state law, which had not adopted the Model Penal Code formulation of
bribery. Under the Model Penal Code scheme, Roma would have been decided differently and wrongly. By contrast, United Stales v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002), is a
good example of the problems that inevitably result from omitting a corrupt state of
mind requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 201-14.
189 96 F.3d at 566.
190 Id. at 568.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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the FBI and cooperated with the resulting investigation.194 Zanni and
Roma later brought a civil claim against the "de facto government"
that included a count under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
95
Organizations Act (RICO).1

The district court concluded that Roma and Zanni could not
bring a RICO claim because they were not "innocent victims," that is,
their capitulation to the extortion was itself illegal behavior-namely
bribery. 19 6 The First Circuit condemned the district court's reliance
on the Model Penal Code analysis of bribery, claiming that the ALI
view "represents a shift from the common law in expanding the scope
of bribery sanctions for payors to situations in which the payor does
not act corruptly."'1 9 7 The court continued "[t]he mens rea implicated
by 'corruptly' concerns the intention to obtain ill-gotten gain; by contrast, the Model Penal Code converts the lack of willpower to stand up
to abusive authority into a degree of culpability."' 9 8 The court allowed Roma and Zanni to continue with their RICO claim because
they "were in fact victims of coercive extortion, and ...have not pled
guilty to a crime that involves 'corrupt intent' as an element."1 99 Tellingly, the court commented that "' [t]he best thing that can be said for
[the Model Penal Code's conception of bribery] is that it makes difficult questions of crime definition easy, but this clarity is bought at the
cost of ignoring the settled law of centuries and current notions of
right and wrong.' "201
Roma demonstrates that, because bribery and extortion are
crimes that cover the same conduct, a well-defined corrupt state of
mind requirement is necessary to protect the victims of color-of-right
extortion from charges of bribery.
194 Id.
195 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000) [hereinafter RICO]. In this case, the
predicate acts for the RICO count were state extortion provisions under Rhode Island
law. See Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D.R.I. 1995).
196 Roma, 906 F. Supp. at 78, 81-82. The court analyzes the "innocent victim"
element under Rhode Island's bribery law, which is substantially similar to federal
bribery under § 201(b). Id. Compare R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-7-4(a) (1953) ("No person
shall corruptly give ...

any gift or valuable consideration to ... any public official as

an inducement or reward for doing or forebearing to do... any act in relation to the
business of... the state, city or town of which he or she is an official."), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 201 (b) (punishing "[w] hoever... corruptly gives... anything of value to any public
official ... with intent ... to influence any official act").
197 Roma, 96 F.3d at 573.
198 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
199 Id.
200 Id. (quoting Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824 n.41).
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In contrast to the First Circuit's ruling in Roma, the Second Circuit found that victims of color-of-right extortion could be charged as
bribegivers in

United States v. Alfisi. 21'

In Alfisi, Mark Alfisi was

charged with bribery and payment of an illegal gratuity. 21 2 The
charges were predicated upon a series of payments made by Alfisi to
203
William Cashin, a USDA Marketing Agricultural Service inspector.
According to the court, a "routine" practice at Hunt's Point Market
(where Alfisi and Cashin conducted business) was to bribe a USDA
inspector to alter his report of produce shipment's quality in such a
way as to allow the bribegiver to renegotiate advantageously the contract price for the shipment. 2°1 4 Alfisi argued that he did not pay
Cashin to secure an unfair benefit; rather, given the routine (and
hence, expected) nature of the kickback, he paid only to induce
Cashin to perform his job faithfully. 211 5 In effect, Alfisi argued that

Cashin was extorting the payments in return for proper performance
of his official duties.
The court responded to Alfisi's argument in a remarkable fashion. It contended that, even if Alfisi were an extortion victim only
paying Cashin to perform his lawful duty, Alfisi would nevertheless be
guilty of the bribery charges. Relying on United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers,206 the court maintained, "a defendant may be properly convicted for paying bribes to a public official for any kind of quid pro quo
exchange.'211 7 The court thus reduced "corruptly" from a meaningful

state of mind element to a mere aid for distinguishing between a bribe
2 8
and an illegal gratuity. 0

The court contended that a corrupt state of mind element is unnecessary to avoid problems of over- and underbreadth. It maintained that the risk of overbreadth is "minimalized . . . by the

existence of the economic coercion defense." 2119 The court balked at
the prospect of requiring proof of unlawful intent; it feared that "if
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt actual or intended violations of official duties, many highly culpable payments
201
202

308 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 146 (stating that Alfisi was charged under both 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1) (A)

(2000) (bribery of a public official) and 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1)(A) (giving an illegal
gratuity to a public official)).
203 Id. at 147.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206
207

526 U.S. 398 (1998).
Alfisi, 308 F.3d at 150 n.1 (first emphasis added).

208
209

Id. at 151 n.2.
Id. at 151.

"CORRUPTLY"

2003]

would go underpunished as unlawful gratuities, or unpunished altogether."2 1 The court proved too much-its phobia of making culpability an element of the crime rather than an issue of judicial
discretion has no place in a free society operating on a presumption
of innocence.
The court's majority opinion is countered successfully by Judge
Sack's dissent. Judge Sack argued, "the nature of the quid pro quo the
payor is looking for matters." 2 1 1 Sack contended that "to act corruptly
is to act with the specific intent to secure an unlawful advantage or
benefit." 2 12 Sack commented insightfully on the majority's interpretation of Sun-Diamond Growers, noting that
[A] ttributing the quid pro quo element to the word "corruptly" does
not avoid the surplusage because the words of the statute indicate
that the quid pro quo element is established not by the term "corruptly," but rather by other terms, i.e., a payment "with intent.., to
2 13
influence an official act."
Sack contended, "Sun-Diamond... holds what plain meaning suggests:
The quid pro quo element arises not from the term 'corruptly,' but
rather from the term 'to influence."'

2 14

The lesson of Roma and Alfisi is apparent. The Roma court, by
requiring a corrupt state of mind, could distinguish between licit and
illicit behavior without significant difficulty, could maintain a definition of corruption that is neither over- nor underbroad, and could
limit the borders of a potentially limitless extortion statute. The Alfisi
court, by effectively reading the corrupt state of mind requirement
out of the bribery statute, left itself helpless in the face of these
problems.
V. A

SURVEY OF THE MODERN COURTS

A.

The Supreme Court

Most courts operate with neither the insightfulness of the Roma
court nor the blindness of the Alfisi court, but rather fall somewhere
in between. The Supreme Court's .jurisprudence regarding extortion
is confused in many respects. Since the passage of the Hobbs Act, the
Court has struggled with the breadth of the Act's coverage, particu210
211
212
213
214

Id.
Id. at 154 (Sack, J., dissenting).
Id. (Sack, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
Id. at 156 (SackJ., dissenting).
Id. at :157 (Sack, J., dissenting).
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larly in the areas of organized labor2 1 5 and, more relevant to this
2 16
Note, color-of-right extortion.
The Court's confusion regarding color-of-right extortion-particularly in the context of campaign finance-is understandable. The
Hobbs Act, on its face, could criminalize substantial amounts of common campaign finance activity; yet reforming the campaign finance
system by arresting politicians for the receipt of private funds was not
the Act's purpose, or even within its feasible charter.2 17 Nevertheless,
the Court recognized that some campaign finance activity is culpable
under extortion or bribery in the three cases that best define the
Court's jurisprudence regarding color-of-right extortion: McCormick v.
United States,218 Evans v. United States,219 and United States v. Sun-Dia220
mond Growers.
In McCormick, Robert L. McCormick, a former member of the
West Virginia House of Delegates, appealed his conviction under the
Hobbs Act. 22 ' The background of McCormick's conviction, while
unique in its details, describes a fairly commonplace situation for an
elected politician, that is, a context of closely interacting personal and
constituent interests.
In the early 1980s, West Virginia "had long suffered" from a
shortage of licensed medical doctors. 2 22 In response, the state developed a program that allowed graduates of foreign medical schools to
obtain temporary licenses to practice while they studied for state licensing exams. 223 Although some temporary license holders repeatedly failed the state licensing exams, the state allowed them to retain
the privilege to practice. 224 The House of Delegates debated ending
the temporary licensing program, and in response several of the temporary license holders formed a political interest group and hired a
lobbyist. 22 5 The lobbyist contacted McCormick, who successfully
sponsored a bill that extended the life of the temporary licensing program.22 6 McCormick then agreed to sponsor legislation that would
215
216
States,
217
218
219
220
221

See supra Part III.
See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); see also Evans v. United
504 U.S. 255 (1991).
See supra Part III.
500 U.S. 257 (1991).
504 U.S. 255 (1992).
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 261, 266-67.

222 Id. at 259.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 259-60.
226 Id. at 260.
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grant a permanent license without testing temporary license holders
227
who had sufficient experience.
In 1984, McCormick successfully ran for reelection. 228 During
the campaign (after he had extended the life of the temporary permit
program but before he had an opportunity to propose the permanent
license legislation), McCormick told the doctors' lobbyist that "his
campaign was expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of
his own pocket, and that he had not heard anything from the foreign
doctors."2 29 The lobbyist contacted the doctors, and returned to Mc230
Cormick with two envelopes containing a total of $2900 in cash.
McCormick twice more received cash payments from the doctors, but
he did not list any of these payments as campaign contributions, nor
did he report the money as income in his tax return. 23 1 McCormick
was investigated and subsequently charged with five counts of Hobbs
23 2
Act extortion under color of official right.

The Supreme Court overturned McCormick's conviction because
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "affirmed McCormick's conviction on legal and factual theories never tried before the jury."23 3 The
Court first considered the sufficiency of the jury instructions, concluding that "the Court of Appeals [failed to] note that the jury was not
instructed in accordance with the court's holding that the difference
between legitimate and illegitimate campaign contributions was to be
determined by the intention of the parties after considering specified
factors."

234

The Court considered McCormick's claim that the payments
made by the doctors "were campaign contributions, the receipt of
which did not violate the Hobbs Act."23 5 In reaching this conclusion,

the Court disapproved of a seven-part test used by the courts below to
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate contributions. The factors of
that test were
(1) whether the money was recorded by the payor as a campaign
contribution, (2) whether the money was recorded and reported by
the official as a campaign contribution, (3) whether the payment

was in cash, (4) whether it was delivered to the official personally or
227
228
229'
230
231
232

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 261.

233
234

Id. at 270 n.8.
Id. at 269 (emphasis added).

235

Id. at 268.
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to his campaign, (5) whether the official acted in his official capacity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or
supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the
official had supported similar legislation before the time of the payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or indirectly solic23 6
ited the payor individually for the payment.
The Court rightly noted that the seven-part test used by the court below was not an adequate determinate of whether or not funds were
extorted or contributed, because even if "the result of each of these
seven inquiries was unfavorable to McCormick . . .we cannot agree
that a violation of the Hobbs Act would be made out. ' 23 7 Instead, the
Court held that the proper test for color-of-right extortion would be
the finding of a quid pro quo, that is, "if the payments are made in
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not perform an official act." 218 The Court asserted that
"[t]his formulation defines the forbidden zone of conduct with sufficient clarity,"2 9 and further, that
[t]o hold otherwise would open to prosecution conduct that has
long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in
a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are
financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have
40
been from the beginning of the Nation.2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia proposed an idiosyncratic
reading of extortion at common law. After discussing some of the
history of the Hobbs Act, Justice Scalia disparaged the majority's
"questionable" assumption that "under color of official right means
on account of one's office." 4 1 Justice Scalia proposed that a more
historically accurate reading of color-of-right extortion "more naturally connotes some false assertion of official entitlement to the property."2 42 Justice Scalia's position has merit insofar as it recognizes that,
historically, public officials had to know that they were not entitled to
that which they took. Insofar as he contends that color-of-right extortion necessarily entails fraud, however, Justice Scalia misapprehends
2 43
the law. This will be discussed at length later.
236 McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S.
257 (1991).
237 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
238 Id. at 273.
239 Id. at 272.

240
241
242
243

Id. at 273.
Id. at 278 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
See infra text accompanying notes 283-300.
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McCormick admirably demonstrates the confusion under which
the Court labors regarding color-of-right extortion. The Court faced
a difficult dilemma: it not only had to adjudicate with some clarity the
thin and wavering line that separates legitimate campaign contributions from extorted payoffs, it had to do so without creating excessive
overbreadth or underbreadth in the Hobbs Act. A plain reading of
the statute would have resulted in its potential application to "conduct
that has long been thought to be well within the law," and even adhering to the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test would have extended the
statute to apply to lawful conduct.244 Neither was the Court free to
exempt transactions in the political realm from the Hobbs Act, because the color of official right provision in § 1951 (b) (2) cannot be
reasonably read not to apply to such conduct. By establishing a quid
pro quo requirement, the Court attempted to limit the breadth of
color-of-right extortion to an appropriate scope while defining "the
24 5
forbidden zone of conduct with sufficient clarity."
While the quid pro quo requirement adequately addresses the
problems of breadth and differentiation directly presented by McCormick, it fails to fix either problem generally. Regarding breadth, the
quid pro quo requirement shares the same flaw as the seven-part test
that it replaced: both standards criminalize otherwise accepted and
lawful conduct. At the same time, a defendant could fail every aspect
of the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test and yet not be guilty of color-ofright extortion. 246 The quid pro quo standard narrows, but does not
solve, the overbreadth problem. Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted in
247
dissent, "quid pro quo tends to confuse the analysis."
Overbreadth and underbreadth remain a problem under the
quid pro quo standard. The requirement increases the difficulty of
proving a charge of Hobbs Act extortion against public officials involved in the normal rough-and-tumble of campaign finance, but it
still includes some of those activities within the line of statutory proscription, especially in light of the Court's reluctance to allow the requirement to be circumvented by "winks and nods." 248 In the
complex negotiations and exchanges of campaign finance, the term
"quid pro quo" will likely prove unhelpful to a politician seeking to
avoid illegality. First, all campaign donees expect or hope that the
public official to whom they donate will act in their interest in re244
245

McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 273.

246

Id. at 272.

247

Id. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).

248 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 275 (1992); see also United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1992).

1770

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

sponse to the donation. To that extent, all donees act with some intent to influence. Second, all politicians accept donations with some
intent to be influenced. To attract donations, public officials must
promise to act in certain ways for their donees. Officials often phrase
promises as assurances that they will remain open to an idea, or will
remain favorably disposed towards some area of legislation, or even
will choose staff members with the donee's interests in mind. None of
these promises are illegal or even irregular, but, if made in direct connection with a donation, they all technically meet the quid pro quo
standard as "situations [wherein] the official asserts that his official
conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking, ' 2411 particularly in light of the "winks and nods" gloss.

Another example of acceptable behavior criminalized under the
quid pro quo standard is logrolling. Politicians, as a regular part of
their occupation, agree to trade support. Generally, officials will "sell"
votes on issues not directly relevant to their constituencies in return
for similar votes from other officials on issues that do. 250 For example, a senator from Indiana might agree to vote for a bill authorizing
the construction of more coastal lighthouses if a senator from Maine
agrees to vote favorably for corn subsidies. Although surely distasteful
to some observers, this behavior is necessary grease for a legislative
body whose members represent diverse and frequently non-overlapping interests. Logrolling quite literally falls within the quid pro quo
proscription: each official is making an explicit promise that his official conduct will be influenced in return for the other's favor.
Furthermore, the quid pro quo standard adds a problem of underbreadth not found in the Fourth Circuit test because it requires
that the public official perform some act in return for the illicit payment. AsJustice Stevens noted in dissent, "[s]ubtle extortion isjust as
wrongful-and probably much more common-than the kind of express understanding that the Court's opinion seems to require. 25 ' In
common practice, public officials can extort without explicitly promising benefit or threatening harm; the threat of harm, if any, may be the
unstated power inherent in the office itself. Under the quid pro quo
standard, the conduct of public officials who make bald requests for
funds unaccompanied by explicit promises or threats (even though an
implicit threat exists by virtue of the office) falls outside of the proscriptions of the Hobbs Act.
249 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273.
250 See Philip P. Fricky & Steven S. Smith, JudicialReview, the CongressionalProcess,
and the Federalism Cases: An InterdisciplinaryCritique, 1I YALE L.J. 1707, 1712 (2002).
251 McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

20031

2 CORRUPTLY"

A better method of achieving the delicate balance towards which
the Court strives does exist. Rather, this method existed at common
law, and has been largely overlooked by the modern law. The corrupt
state of mind element as found in the common law functioned to resolve precisely the questions of breadth and differentiation that
plagued the McCormick Court. A corrupt state of mind requirement
solves the problem of breadth by making knowledge of wrongdoing
part of the definition of the crime. Public officials conducting the
normal gray affairs of campaigning are safe from conviction so long as
they avoid accepting contributions that they know to be illegal. The
courts also benefit from a flexible and adroit standard capable of adequately differentiating between licit and illicit behavior in a wide variety of situations.
Much of the utility of corrupt state of mind as a standard is that it
is an element of intent. As such, it naturally requires circumstantial
evidence for its proof.2 5

2

In a corrupt state of mind analysis, all the

factors of the Fourth Circuit's seven-part test would be relevant not to
prove that the defendant committed extortion, but to prove that he
acted corruptly. The court would have to further determine that the
conduct was itself illicit to convict. This extra layer of analysis narrows
the scope of the Hobbs Act more precisely than the quid pro quo
requirement. Corrupt state of mind analysis mitigates the overbreadth problem by limiting the statute to persons who know that
they are misusing their office. For example, logrolling, which falls
squarely within the quid pro quo standard, is rightfully viewed as lawful conduct under a corrupt state of mind analysis. The required finding of a corrupt mind also significantly mitigates the underbreadth
problem by allowing the statute to reach persons who extort without
making explicit threats or promises, if the circumstantial evidence
demonstrates an unlawful intent.
A corrupt state of mind requirement also helps courts to differentiate more adeptly between legitimate and illegitimate behavior. By
criminalizing behavior that an official knew was unlawful, and recognizing such knowledge (shown by circumstantial evidence such as requesting cash payments or improper tax reporting) as an element of
the crime, the corrupt intent element steers courts towards bona fide
extortions and away from legitimate but questionable behavior. For
example, under a corrupt state of mind analysis, the Court would have
probably upheld McCormick's conviction because the available evidence demonstrated that he understood the illegality of his conduct.
By concentrating on the actual intent of the official, the Court can
252

See KAPLAN

ET AL.,

supra note 18, at 706-08.
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more discerningly evaluate questionable conduct. This is not to say
that all receipts of value that an official believes are unlawful constitute extortion; rather, such a belief can serve as a helpful guide for
courts that must make bright-line differentiations in unclear areas of
conduct.
In Evans v. United States,253 the Supreme Court defined color-ofright extortion under the Hobbs Act as an offense derived from the
common law. 2 54

The issue considered by the Evans Court was

"whether an affirmative act of inducement by a public official, such as
a demand, is an element of extortion under color of official right prohibited by the Hobbs Act. '25 5 The defendant, John Evans, was an
elected public official serving on the Board of Commissioners of
DeKalb County, Georgia. 2r5 6 As part of a federal investigation into
public corruption in the Atlanta, an FBI special agent initiated a series
of conversations (almost all of which were taped or recorded) in
which he sought Evans's help in rezoning a twenty-five acre tract of
land.2 57 The agent provided Evans with cash totaling $7000 and a

$1000 check written to his campaign. 2 58 Evans reported the check as
a campaign donation, but did not report the cash as a campaign donation or as income for tax purposes. 2 59 At trial, the jury found that
Evans accepted the cash "knowing that it was intended to ensure that
he would vote in favor of the rezoning application and that he would
try to persuade his fellow commissioners to do likewise." 260 The trial
court instructed the jury that "if [Evans] demands or accepts money in
exchange for [a] specific requested exercise of his or her official
power, such a demand or acceptance does constitute a violation of the
Hobbs Act regardless of whether the payment was made in the form of
a campaign contribution."' 2 11 In affirming the conviction, the Eleventh Circuit held that the inducement requirement "is automatically
262
satisfied by the power connected with the public office."

The Supreme Court affirmed Evans's conviction by insisting that,
consistent with color-of-right extortion at common law, quid pro quo
253 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
254
255
256

d. at 259.
Id. at 256 (quotations omitted).
1d. at 257.

257

Id.

258
259
260
261

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.

262

Id. at 258 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
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does not require the public official to have induced payment.2 3
Rather, the Court maintained, "although [Evans] did not initiate the
transaction, his acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit promise to use his official position to serve the interests of the
bribegiver. '' 26

4

This holding, insofar as it suggests that the quid pro

quo need not be express, exists in tension with McCormick's contrary
holding.
Although the tension between the holdings in Evans and McCormick suggests that the quid pro quo standard is functionally inadequate, Evans's primary significance for the purposes of this Note is
that in both the majority and dissenting opinions the Court insists that
Congress deliberately enacted common-law extortion by passing the
Hobbs Act.2

65

Further, the Court uses the common law to clarify

whether or not color-of-right extortion contains an inducement element.2

66

Recognizing that Hobbs Act extortion is an offense funda-

mentally defined by the common law allowed the Court to
acknowledge that the official did not have to induce the payment to
commit a culpable act-he needed only to receive it.267 While the
Court did use the common-law "no inducement" gloss to repair some
of the breadth problems that it created with the quid pro quo test, it
created two additional problems. First, the Court failed to realize that
a "no inducement" gloss on culpable conduct only makes sense in
light of an additional corrupt state of mind requirement. Second, by
allowing implicit quid pro quo exchanges to count, the Evans Court
created significant tension with the previous year's holding in
McCormick.
The Court emphasized the Hobbs Act's common-law origin by
reiterating the holding from Taylor v. United States:268 "'a statutory
term is generally presumed to have its common law meaning."269
The Court also read the Hobbs Act in light of the teaching of Morris270
ette v. United States.
[W] here Congress borrows terms of art which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
263 Id. at 255-56.
264 i. at 257.
265 Id. at 255; see also id. at 279 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266 The Court recently reaffirmed itscommitment to interpreting the Hobbs Act
in light of common-law extortion in Scheidler v. Nalt Org. for Women 537 U.S. 393
(2003).

267 Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60.
268 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
269 Evans, 504 U.S. at 259 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592).
270

342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and
the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be
taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a depar27 1
ture from them.
The Court, after reviewing the various opinions of the circuits, concluded that "the majority view is consistent with the common-law definition of extortion, which we believe Congress intended to adopt,
272
[and] we endorse that position."
After establishing that Congress enacted common-law extortion,
the Court attempted to define common-law extortion:
At common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public
official who took "by colour of his office" money that was not due to
him for the performance of his official duties. A demand, or request, by the public official was not an element of the offense. Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we
2 73
would now describe as "taking a bribe."
This definition, while technically correct, is remarkably unhelpful. As
this Note shows, a deeper look at common-law history yields a more
2 74
detailed and helpful definition.
The other issue of significance addressed by the Evans Court was
whether the Hobbs Act had modified common-law extortion. The
Court recognized that the Hobbs Act was modeled on the Field
Code, 275 which itself directly adopted common-law extortion.2 76 The
Court determined that Congress had not significantly changed the
common-law definition of extortion, since "[t] here was nothing in either the statutory text or the legislative history that could fairly be
described as a 'contrary direction.' ,,27 7 Most important, the Court acknowledged the significance of "common law history to guide our interpretation of the statutory text" when considering color-of-right
extortion in the Hobbs Act. 27" Furthermore, the Court explicitly
stated that, at common law, "extortion was defined as the corrupt tak271
272
273
274

275
276
277
278

Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263).
Id. at 259.
1(. at 260.
See supra Part 1.
See supra Part 1Il; see also Field Code, supra note 20, § 613.
Evans, 504 U.S. at 261 n.9; see supra Part III.A.
Id. at 264 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263).
Id. at 265.
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ing or receipt of an unlawful fee by a public officer under color of
279

office."

The Evans Court invoked the common law to address the underbreadth problem created by McCormick's quid pro quo standard. In so
doing, the Evans Court nevertheless failed to address the problems of
overbreadth and differentiation also created by quid pro quo.280 Furthermore, the Evans Court (like most modern courts) ignored the full
import of an extortion statute informed by the common law. Although the Court recognized that the common law defined color-ofright extortion as a corrupt taking, it treated corrupt intent as surplusage empty of content and unworthy of comment. Nevertheless, the
Court's holding that official right extortion has no inducement requirement only makes sense in light of a corrupt intent element.
Without an element of unlawful intent, color-of-right extortion under
Evans is essentially a strict liability crime. The "no inducement" holding, in light of quid pro quo holding in McCormick, makes the predicate conduct intentless: since the official need not have induced the
payment, the official need only know that he was accepting any payment at all. Under Evans, a politician could conceivably spend twenty
years in prison because he was mistaken about the legality of what he
believed to be an innocent campaign contribution.
In both Evans and McCormick, Justice Scalia disagreed with the
majority's conception of color-of-right extortion at common law. In
McCormick, Justice Scalia contended that the color-of-right language
"connote[d] some false assertion of official entitlement to the property."28 1 Later, in Evans,Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which Justice Scaliajoined. 28 2 Following the line of thought Scalia established

in McCormick, Thomas's dissent argued that the
color of office element of extortion . . .had a definite and well-

established meaning at common law. "At common law it was essential that the money or property be obtained under color of office,
that is, under the pretense that the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his
office. The money or thing received must have been claimed or acand the person paying must have yielded
cepted in right of office,
28 3
authority.
official
to
Thomas maintained, "[a] survey of 19th and early 20th century cases

construing state extortion statutes in light of the common law makes
279
280

Id. at 265 n.14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 265.

281

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 278 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring).

Evans, 504 U.S. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 279 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 RONALD A.
TON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1393, at 790 (1957)).
282
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plain that the offense was understood to involve not merely a wrongful taking by a public official, but a wrongful taking under a false pre2 84
tense of official right."
Justice Thomas's historical analysis rightly recognizes that colorof-right extortion at common law involved an element of knowledge
that the fee taken for official action was inappropriate. Indeed, the
social and economic context of medieval England practically required
laws governing extortion to some special state of mind element, because all officials legally accepted private fees for official action. 28 5
Justice Thomas, however, concluded that this special state of mind
element was not "corruptly," but rather intent to defraud. He reached
this conclusion by examining early American case law, virtually all of
which was decided after the corrupt state of mind requirement became "lost."2 8 6 Ironically, to support his theory of color-of-right extor-

tion-as-fraud, justice Thomas cited authority that rightly recognizes a
corrupt state of mind:
Our extortion statute, which had its origin at least as early as 1796,
appears on its face to have been originally intended to be reiterative
of the common law. The essence of that offense was the receiving
or taking by any public officer, by color of his office, of any fee or
reward not allowed by law for performing his duties. The purpose
would seem to be simply to penalize the officer who non-innocently insisted upon a larger fee than he was entitled to or a fee where none was
permitted or required to be paidfor the performance of an obligatryfunction

of his office. The matter was obviously of particular importance in
the days when public officials received their compensation through
28 7
fees collected and not by a fixed salary.
Justices Scalia and Thomas misinterpreted the common law as
saying that color-of-right extortion always involved pretense or fraud.
While color-of-right extortion certainly could involve pretense or
fraud, these are not necessary elements of the crime. This can be easily shown by review of a few of the cases that support this Note's historical analysis. 288 Rex v. Seymour and Others,28s9 Rex v. Young & Pilts,290
and Rex v. William 29 1 are three examples of common law color-of284

Id. at 281 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).

285 See supra Part L.A-B.
286 See supra note 20.
287 Evans, 504 U.S. at 284 n.4 (Thomas, j., dissenting) (quoting State v. Begyn, 167
A.2d 161, 166-67 (N.J. 1967)) (citations omitted).
288 See supra Part I.
289 87 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1740).
290 97 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1758).
291 97 Eng. Rep. 851 (K.B. 1762).
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right extortions without pretense or fraud-these cases involved bald
unlawful demands. Furthermore, as Rex v. Wadsworth,29 2 Rex v. Roberts,293 and Lake's Casd294 all demonstrate, the class of possible offend-

ers in common-law extortion extended beyond public officials to
civilians (such as millers or ferrymen) who were subject to customary
fee limitations. If civilians that collected customary dues could be
prosecuted for color-of-right extortion, and the customary fees were a
matter of common knowledge, the offense could not have always required pretense or fraud, because deception in that context would
have been improbable bordering on impossible. Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas's conception of common-law extortion is, however,
understandable. The Justices drew mainly from sources that were
written after corrupt intent became "lost" in the late eighteenth century.2

95

Some of the cases cited by these sources, such as People v.

Whaley, nevertheless essentially retained a corrupt state of mind requirement without using the word "corruptly."2 9 6 Other sources, such
as the Field Code, did not.
The Justices' position seems to rely upon commentary found in
the Field Code. 29 7 In a footnote to a section on obtaining property by

false pretenses under the crime of false personation, the Code explains that, in that specific section, it forewent the use of the phrase
"'by color of' ... in order that it may be clear that [false personation]
cases are embraced in which a false pretense is used in aid of the
fraud, but such pretense is not the controlling inducement operative
2 8
9 This commentary seems to
upon the mind of the party defrauded.""
imply whatJustice Thomas claims-that the color-of-right language at
common law applied only to false pretenses. Unfortunately, Field
himself may have substantially overlooked the import of "corruptly" as
it related to color-of-right extortion; or at least failed to make it express. 299 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas consequently misinterpret
the message of the common law. A deeper reach into earlier com292 87 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1694).
293 87 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1693).
294 74 Eng. Rep. 677 (K.B. 1591).
295 In McCormick, Justice Scalia relies upon People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (NY. Sup.
Ct. 1827). McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 279 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Evans, Justice Thomas's dissent uses Collier v. State, 55 Ala. 125 (1867), and
Whaley to support the relevant points. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 281-82
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
296 See supra Part III.C.
297 See Field Code, supro note 20, § 623 cmt.

298

Id.

299

See supra Part III.
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Justices' misapprehension, however, is less harmful than others that
the Court has relied upon in this field.
For example, in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,3 01 the Supreme Court emphasized the similarity in kind between bribery and
color-of-right extortion by equating the corrupt state of mind requirement on the face of the bribery statute with the quid pro quo standard
3 2
laid out in McCormick. 0

The defendants, members of an agricultural interest group, were
charged with violating the gratuities statute for giving former Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy approximately $5900 in gifts. 3 °3 The
defendants challenged the district court's jury instruction, which
"placed an expansive gloss" on 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) by "saying, among
other things, that 'I[i] t is sufficient if Sun-Diamond provided Espy with
unauthorized compensation simply because he held public office,'
and that '[t]he government need not prove that the alleged gratuity
was linked to a specific or identifiable official act or any act at all.' "304
To help explain its view of the law, the Supreme Court endeavored to "place § 201(c) (1) (A) within the context of the statutory
scheme."'3 0 5 The Court noted that the difference between the two
crimes subsisted primarily in their state of mind requirements:
"[b]ribery requires intent 'to influence' an official act.., while illegal
gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted 'for or
because of' an official act. In other words, for bribery there must be a
quid pro quo."'30 6 Although it construed illegal gratuities as a strict liability crime, the Court nevertheless maintained that even the gratuities statute requires a nexus between the gift and some official act
beyond the possession of office itself.3°1 7 The difference between brib-

ery and an illegal gratuity, then, is an issue of degree rather than of
kind: where bribery requires a quid pro quo between the gift and a
specific act, an illegal gratuity needs only a connection to any act at all.
According to the Court, the benefit of this position is that it allows the

300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

See supra Part I.
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405-06.
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statute's definition of "official act"30° to control the bounds of the
statute.
The Court's equation of a corrupt state of mind requirement with
the finding of quid pro quo is not entirely dysfunctional, but it is insufficient. First, reading "corruptly" as a specific intent to trade pecuniary value for an official act fails to protect either the possibly
extorted bribegiver or the possibly mistaken public official bribetaker
from the problems of breadth that plague color-of-right extortion.
Tellingly, the Court admits that conduct permissible under guidelines
established by the Office of Governmental Ethics could conceivably
still violate the illegal gratuities statute. 30 9 Also, by comparing illegal
gratuities and bribery in terms of different degrees of quid pro quo,
the Court's interpretation demotes "corruptly," the express intent element in the bribery statute, from an element of the crime to little
more than a glorified sentencing guideline.
B.

The Circuits

The circuit courts that have considered color-of-right extortion
fall into two groups regarding corrupt intent The Second, Third,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals attempt to approximate a
corrupt intent element without using the "corruptly" language. The
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals expressly recognize
a corrupt state of mind requirement, but treat it as surplusage.
One commonality amongst the circuits that bears discussion is a
significant agreement (at least before the holding to the same effect
in United States v. Evans3 10 ) that bribery and extortion are not mutually exclusive, and that both crimes may stem from the same underlying conduct.3 11 Because a corrupt state of mind requirement is on
the face of the federal bribery statute, 312 the agreement amongst the
circuits that the same predicate conduct can lead to Hobbs Act colorof-right extortion strongly suggests that corrupt state of mind is an
implicit part of the extortion statute.
308

The statute defines official act as "[a]ny decision or action on any question,

matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit." 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a)(3) (2000).
309 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 412.
310 United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
311 See United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.

Adcock, 558 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.
1976); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Hyde,
448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
312 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1) ("whoever ... corruptly gives").
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1. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits
The Second Circuit addressed color-of-right Hobbs Act extortion
in United States v. Coyne.""' In Coyne, the court affirmed a conviction
for federal extortion and bribery. 3 14 Coyne challenged the jury in-

struction given at trial. 15 The instruction required the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant accepted or
solicited the thing of value, at least in part, for or because of his conduct or intending to be influenced in connection with any business or
transaction

....

"3

16

Coyne's objection was to the "in part" language in

the instruction, but the unchallenged portion of the instruction constituted a finding of corrupt state of mind. The Second Circuit upheld the instruction's propriety because it "satisfies the quid pro quo
requirement of McCormick. '3

17

The court failed to realize what this

Note argues: that instruction, by requiring a corrupt state of mind as
an element of the crime, provided a standard both truer to the common law and more useful than the quid pro quo standard. Coyne
shows that the Second Circuit defined color-of-right extortion in
terms of an unlawful intent, and that they were able to do so because,
in that case, the conduct also fell within the standard of quid pro quo.
When the Second Circuit faces a more marginal case, where a public
official's conduct includes a quid pro quo but does not include an
unlawful intent,""' the court's duty to comply with the quid pro quo
standard laid down by the Supreme Court will leave it vulnerable to
the problems of breadth and differentiation.
The Third Circuit similarly approximated corrupt intent in
United States v. Ceyilli.319 Cerilliinvolved questionable political finance
practices, but was decided before Evans or McCormick. Because the
case was decided before McCormick and Evans, the Third Circuit was
free from a precedential mandate to apply the quid pro quo standard.
313

4 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993).

314 Id. at 113.
315 Id.
316 Id. (emphasis added).
317 Id. at 114.
318 The Second Circuit's approach is ill-equipped to deal with any case where a
public official accepts any thing of value with any connection to her official duty. For
example, accepting ajacket in return for participation in a charity golf event while in
office would constitute grounds for prosecution under this view. See, e.g., United
States v. McDade, 827 F.Supp. 1153, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to dismiss counts
of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right and bribery directed at Congressman Joseph McDade, despite McDade's belief that he had acted in accordance with
the House Rules of Ethics).
319 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1979).
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The court affirmed the conviction on the grounds that Cerilli acted
with a corrupt state of mind, without explicitly using the "corruptly"
language. Cerilli, a Superintendent for the Pennsylvania Department
of Tranportation in Westmoreland County, was convicted of Hobbs
Act extortion for requiring extra payments from companies that
wished to compete for contracts to lease snow removal equipment.3t21
Cerilli contended that these payments were political contributions
(some of the payments were in fact checks made out to political committees), and that these contributions could not be punished under
the Hobbs Act because they were not collected for an unlawful purpose. 32 1 The court recognized that "[t]he receipt of money whether

by a political party, a charitable institution, or by an individual is generally not inherently wrongful. The wrong under the Hobbs Act is the manner in which it is obtained."

22

Determining that Cerilli and his

confederates obtained the money wrongfully, the court affirmed their
convictions. The key distinction made by the court was that the crime
was collecting the money with an unlawful purpose, not necessarily for
an unlawful purpose. This insistence that subjective intent mattered
was, in effect, a reinstatement of a corrupt intent requirement. The
only thing the court lacked was a literary vessel in which to encapsulate its meaning-"corruptly" would have served well. The Third Circuit, however, is now required to subordinate this insight to the quid
pro quo standard. In "middle of the road" cases this will make little
difference, but, as always, harder cases will expose the court to the
functional problems of breadth and differentiation that the corrupt
state of mind requirement aims to solve.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Taylor823 is a
model of how the quid pro quo problems of breadth and differentiation can be avoided by requiring a corrupt state of mind. In Taylor,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction of a state legislator for extortion and bribery. 3 24 At trial, the jury was instructed that "[t]here
need be no specific quid pro quo to establish extortion under color of
official right. .

.

. In other words, the essence of the offense is the

corrupt effort to obtain payment of the powers public office (sic)
.... 325 In light of the holdings in Evans and McCormick, the Fourth
Circuit was unable to approve this instruction, and held that the prosecution had to prove only that "a public official has obtained a pay320
321

Id. at 418.
Id. (emphasis added).

322

Id. at 419-20 (emphasis added).

323

993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1993).

324 Id. at 382.
325

Id. at 385.
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ment to which he is not entitled, knowing that the payment was in
return for official acts."3 2 6 Evans and McCormick required the Fourth
Circuit to lose an effective instruction: by complying with the Supreme
Court's demand for a quid pro quo, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
entire instruction, the second part of which rightly required a corrupt
state of mind. Had the court been free to approve of the district
court's common-law-based instruction, it would have been able to affirm the conviction. Instead, the Fourth Circuit found itself helpless
in the face of the underbreadth created by the quid pro quo standard.
Because no explicit exchange had occurred, the corrupt behavior
could not be punished.
The Ninth Circuit addressed color-of-right extortion under the
Hobbs Act in United States v. Carpenter.327 California state senator Paul
Carpenter appealed his conviction of four counts of racketeering and
extortion. 28 At issue in the appeal was whether Carpenter's jury instruction, which stated, "there need be no specific quid pro quo to
establish extortion under color of official right" violated the McCormick standard.3 29 The court held that such an instruction was imper3
missible, and that an explicit quid pro quo was required. t)
The court acknowledged that a great deal of political corruption
does not occur in readily identifiable exchanges in open daylight. Accordingly, it construed McCormick's explicitness standard to apply to
situations beyond when "an official has explicitly stated that he will
exchange official action for a contribution."'3 3 1 The court recognized
that, strictly applied, the express quid pro quo standard would "allow
officials to escape liability under the Hobbs Act with winks and nods,
even when the evidence as a whole proves that there has been a meeting of the minds ...

"332 All that the Ninth Circuit court required for

guilt was that the "quid pro quo be clear and unambiguous, leaving no
uncertainty about the terms of the bargain." 3 The court explained
that the "understanding need not be verbally explicit. The jury may
consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, including the con326 Id.
327 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992).
328 1i. at 825.
329 Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
330 Id.
331 Id. at 827.
332 Id. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was portentous. The Supreme Court later
in the same year also abandoned McCormick's express quid pro quo requirement in
United States v. Evans, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
333

Caipenter, 961 F.2d at 827.
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text in which a conversation took place, to determine if there was a
meeting of the minds on a quid pro quo. '33 4
Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit attempted to construe
the Hobbs Act in a manner that would help it to differentiate between
acceptable and corrupt political activity. The court explained that the
explicitness requirement "serves to distinguish between contributions
that are given or received with the 'anticipation' of official action and
contributions that are given or received in exchange for a 'promise' of
3
official action."

35

Nevertheless, a quid pro quo requirement-even one glossed
with an additional explicitness requirement-is a blunt tool insufficient to the surgical task of separating licit from illicit political activity.
The language of the court, by its appeal to evidence of intent as relevant to the explicitness requirement, suggests that it was attempting to
determine whether the public official intended to subvert his office by
accepting or demanding undue payment. As a matter of common
sense, such an inquiry into whether a public official was acting with
unlawful intent could proceed with greater efficiency and accuracy if
conducted directly, rather than indirectly through the use of a quid
pro quo determination.
2.

The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits

The Fifth Circuit requires extortion to be committed corruptly.
Although the court does not apply the common law term of art "corruptly" to color-of-right extortion, it does define the elements of extortion in the same fashion as it defines the word "corruptly" for
federal bribery. More important, the Circuit's definition of "corruptly" equates with the word's meaning at common law.
In United States v. Tomblin,3 36 Darell A. Tomblin appealed multiple convictions, the relevant of which were federal bribery and Hobbs
Act extortion.3 37 The acts that led to Tomblin's conviction revolved
around his efforts to develop financial prospects in Grenada and to
gain controlling interests in several savings and loan institutions..33 8
Tomblin convinced two Texas bankers to assist with bankrolling his
plans. 339 Tomblin promised that he would use his political influence

with Nevada Senator Jacob Hecht to help the bankers bypass the Fed334
335

Id.
Id.

336
337

46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1374.

338

Id.

339

Id.
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eral Home Loan Bank Board so that they could legitimate their questionable takeover of Suburban

Savings Association.3

40

Tomblin

agreed to use his political influence to arrange a meeting between the
bankers and the chairman of the Board in return for a $250,000 loan,
a $25,000 lobbying fee to a third party, and a $50,000 campaign contribution to Hecht's campaign fund.34 1 Tomblin promised a $50,000

campaign contribution and a 10% share in the venture to Glen Maud42
lin, Hecht's administrative assistant and campaign treasurer. 3
Tomblin's request for the $250,000 loan was the source of his extortion conviction, and his promises to Maudlin were the grounds for the
bribery conviction.

3 43

Affirming Tomblin's conviction for bribery, the court upheld the
district court's jury instructions by reasoning from McCormick and
Evans:

Under the bribery statutes, the government must prove a quid pro
quo, that is, that the official took money in return for an exercise of
official power. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 269-73. In

order to convict a briber, the government must prove that the accused intended to bribe the official. Intending to make a campaign
contribution does not constitute bribery, even though many contributors hope that the official will act favorably because of their
contributions ....
Accordingly, a jury instruction must adequately
distinguish between the lawful intent associated with making a campaign contribution and the unlawful intent associated with
bribery.

-44

The jury instruction to which Tomblin had objected required only
that the bribe have been offered corruptly. 345 Tomblin contended
that a corrupt state of mind requirement was inconsistent with MVcCormick's requirement of a quid pro quo.3 " The court responded that,
because the instructions defined "corruptly" as "'intent to influence
an official act,' the instructions explain the reciprocity element of the
quid pro quo. [By offering money to Maudlin with intent to influence],
Tomblin had acted corruptly, that is, with unlawful purpose."' 47 This definition of the corrupt mental state is consistent with the definition of
corrupt intent at common law, that is, unlawful intent.
340
34]

Id.
Id. at 1375.

342

Id.

343
344
345

Id.
Id. at 1379.
d. at 1380.

346
347

id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The court naturally applied corrupt intent to Tomblin's bribery
charge because a corrupt state of mind requirement is included on
the face of the statute, but it did not apply "corruptly" to the extortion
charge. Instead, the court construed color-of-right extortion so that
an "unlawful purpose" was one of the crime's elements. Unlawful purpose is synonymous with unlawful intent, which is the essence of corrupt intent at common law. To prove that Tomblin had a wrongful
purpose, the court approvingly referenced the jury instruction's statement that "wrongful .. . is to cause the victim to give property to
someone who has no legitimate claim to the property. ' 348 The court's
"legitimate claim" standard asked the jury to evaluate the actor's
awareness of the legitimacy of his claim-that is, his knowledge of the
legality of his actions. The court's color-of-right extortion standard
was therefore not materially different from the requirement of corrupt intent that it affirmed in the bribery conviction.
Tomblin demonstrates the inconsistency created by excluding corrupt state of mind as an element of the Hobbs Act. The court had no
trouble affirming the bribery conviction, but, when it turned to the
extortion conviction, it experienced the underbreadth and differentiation problems created by the lack of a corrupt state of mind requirement. The court's reasoning in affirming Tomblin's bribery
conviction was straightforward, but the court had to engage in verbal
gymnastics to justify upholding the extortion conviction for substantially similar conduct. Further, the logical gymnastics in which the
court engaged were designed to imply an element of corrupt intent
into the Hobbs Act, so that Tomblin's obviously wrongful conduct
could be punished.
3 49
In United States v. Harding,
the Sixth Circuit nominally construed color-of-right extortion to comport with its common-law meaning. Harding, the executive director of the Tennessee Real Estate
Commission, was convicted of extortion for offering to sell copies of
licensing exam answers.35 0 Harding raised objections to the scope of
the Hobbs Act. Affirming his conviction, the court reasoned that the
"'under color of official right' language reflects the common law definition of extortion, which could be committed only by a public official's corrupt taking of a fee under color of his office and did not
require proof of threat, fear, or duress."'3 5 1 The court further noted,
"bribery and extortion as used in the Hobbs Act are not mutually ex348

Id. at 1385.

349
350
351

563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 306.
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clusive. ': 5 2 Both by connotative definition and analogy to bribery, the
court asserted that extortion under color of official right did and
353
should require a corrupt state of mind.
Soon after Harding,the court decided United States v. Butler.3 5 4 In
Butler, the court held that bribery and extortion are not mutually exclusive and could result from the same underlying conduct,3 5 5 implying that extortion under color of right also has to be committed
"corruptly." Also, as in Harding,the court subscribed to the commonlaw definition of extortion that itself included corrupt state of mind as
an element.3 56 Lastly, the court held that "any wrongful use of a public official's power for private personal gain is proscribed by the
Hobbs Act. '13 57 This holding followed the court's earlier statement:
that an official's use of power, to be extortionate, must be committed
with unlawful intent.
Although the Sixth Circuit used the word "corrupt" in its definition of extortion, and its reasoning was at least nominally tailored to
ferret out unlawful intent, the court did not indicate any consciousness of the value of the corrupt state of mind element. Even if the
court did possess such an understanding, it is nevertheless now bound
to follow the holdings of McCormick and Evans, which limit the value
of corrupt intent as a differentiating and limiting element.
The Eighth Circuit occupies a unique position in color-of-right
extortion law. The Circuit recognized corrupt state of mind as an element prior to Evans and McCormick, but the court maintained that the
taking had to be for a corrupt purpose rather than with a corrupt purpose. In United States v. French,3 5 1 the Eighth Circuit explicitly read a
corrupt intent element into color-of-right extortion. French has a fact
pattern strikingly similar to many of the cases at common law. French,
the city marshal of St. Louis, had an official duty to collect from the
surety a forfeited bail bond if the defendant failed to appear in
court.3 59 French was convicted on four occasions for allowing a surety
to pay amounts substantially less than the actual amount of the bond
as long as the surety also made an additional, personal, cash payment
3 60
to French.
352

Id.

353

Id.

354
355
356
357
358

618 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 417-18.
Id.
Id. at 419.
628 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1980).

359
360

Id. at 1071.
Id.
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The court reversed the district court's decision to set aside the
,jury conviction. 3 6 1 Although the district court felt that no extortion
had been proven, the Circuit court maintained that "[t]here is no
doubt that 'under color of official right' includes this kind of corrupt
use of public office by the official to obtain such a wrongful personal
fee." 362 The court further held that "[i t is the wrongful purpose of
the taking under color of official right that makes the appellee's conduct extortion under the Hobbs Act."36 3 The court's idea of wrongful
taking is supported by an explicit statement of corrupt intent: that is,
that "a public officer who corruptly seeks payment in return for shortchanging his duty to enforce the law has committed extortion. 3 6 4
The court asserted that "Hobbs Act coverage may ...extend to other

kinds of wrongful taking of money to which the extortioner may also
have a rightful claim." 3 65 This contention created a critical distinction

between the Eighth Circuit's conception of extortion and the conception at common law: the Eighth Circuit penalized takings for a corrupt purpose, while the common law punished takings with a corrupt
intent.
VI.

JUDGE JOHN

T. NOONAN'S BRIBES

No historical account of extortion or bribery can be complete
3 66 The
without reference to Judge John T. Noonan's book Bribes.'
book, which stands as both a monumental work in its own right and as
the seminal composition in the history of corruption, fails to recognize corrupt state of mind as an element of common-law extortion.
Noonan contends that bribery and extortion were separate crimes at
common law. 36 7 His understanding of bribery at common law in-

cluded a corrupt state of mind,3 68 but he believed that "[e]xtortion
... required a showing of coercion ....- 369 In Noonan's view, extortion always required an element of coercion, therefore whatever state
of mind it may have required was already easily inferred from the coercion. Further, extortion's coercive nature left little danger of a public official committing it with innocent intent, as was possible with
bribetaking. Noonan's view of distinct extortion and bribery informs
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1070.
1073.
1074.

1075.
supra note 9.
Id. at 398-99.
See id. at 334-424.
Id. at 398.
NOONAN,
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his apparent distaste for the use of the Hobbs Act to punish bribetak7
ing behavior by public officials. ' 1
This Note substantially disagrees with Noonan in only one respect: it asserts that, at common (and modern) law, there was (and is)
little distinction between color-of-right extortion and bribery. At least
in this respect, the position adopted by this Note has been supported
by scholarly authority37 1 and, more importantly, by the Supreme
Court in United States v. McCormick 7 2' and United States v. Evans.3 73 As
Professor James Lindgren noted, "Noonan [did not write] a history of
extortion and neither cites any extortion cases to support [his] views
3 74
that extortion was limited to coercion at English common law."
Common-law extortion in England was in one sense similar to
current American jurisprudence. The criminal act alone-receipt of
inappropriate value by a public official-spanned a potentially limitless range of conduct. Furthermore, this law coexisted with a system
in which public officials acted within a complex array of customary
fees, statutory fee tables, and duty. The historical context of the public officials at whom the Crown and the courts directed laws against
corruption contains striking parallels to modern politics, particularly
to the campaign finance system. One primary difference, however,
between corrupt behavior as seen by the common law and modern
corruption law is that common-law extortion operated in the context
of a well-defined intent element-"corruptly"-whereas modern federal extortion law has no coherent principle with which to differentiate the guilty from the innocent, or to limit the potentially limitless
language of the Hobbs Act.
CONCILUSION

Corruption is a practice both complex and historically endemic. 3 7 5 Potentially corrupt behavior often straddles already murky

lines of propriety. To regulate corruption properly, the law requires a
370 See id.at 585-87.
371 See, e.g.,
Lindgren, supra note 15, at 824.
372 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
373 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
374 James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribely-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1729 (1993).
375 Noonan notes "[t]hat bribery is wrong, that a bribe must distort judgmentassumptions which may seem too obvious to need justification-are not self-evident."
NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3. According to Noonan, bribery and extortion were common in cultures ranging from ancient Egypt, Babylon, and Mespotamia, to classic
Rome, Byzantium, England, and the United States of America. hi. at 3-9, 31,104-05,
114-16, 233, 427. Inmodern day Russia, business owners pay public officials an esti-
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mated $33 billion in bribes yearly "to keep things running smoothly .
Sabrina
Tavernise, A Russian Tilts at Graft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at A3.
Examining corruption in the ancient Roman state (circa 74 B.C.) is particularly
instructive: "in Rome, legitimate power was in the hands of a governing elite, which
stood out by its opulence."

1 HISTORY

OF

PRIvATE LIFE, supra note 13, at 95. While

mere access to power, without more, often breeds some corruption, the Roman system compounded the problem by making such access exclusive: "The Senate was a
club, and the club members decided whether or not a man had the social profile
necessary for membership .... Public offices were treated as though they were private
dignities, access to which depended on private contracts." I id. at 95-96. Unsurprisingly, conduct that modern society would characterize as corrupt was rife: "In Rome
every superior stole from his subordinates.... Every public function was a racket .. "
I id. at 97. Although we would classify the Roman system as hopelessly corrupt, it is
more helpful to characterize it as based upon substantially different concepts of right
and reciprocity. See NOONAN, supra note 9, at 3-5. Reciprocity in the form of bribery
was so entrenched in the Roman system that "an official schedule of bribes eventually
was established and posted in every office." I HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 13,
at 99. Failure to act on a bribe by a public official could even give rise to ajudicially
enforceable right to redress on the part of the bribegiver:
Even the least important public positions, (militia), such as apparitor or
clerk of the courts, were sold by their incumbents to aspiring candidates,
because every position carried with it a guaranteed income in the form of
bribes. A new officeholder was supposed to pay a substantial gratuity (sportula) to his superior. In the Late Empire, even the highest dignitaries, appointed by the Emperor, paid such a gratuity to the imperial treasury. From
the very beginning of the Empire, every dignity bestowed by the emperor,
from consul to mere captain, imposed upon the person honored the moral
duty to make a bequest to his benefactor, the emperor. Failure to fulfill this
duty meant running the risk of having one's will set aside for ingratitude and
one's estate confiscated by the imperial treasury. And, since every nomination was Inade on the recommendation of "patrons" with court connections,
these recommendations (suffragia) were sold, or, in any case, paid for. If the
patron did not keep his word, the victim did not hesitate to complain to the
courts.
1 id. at 98-99.
Although bribery was not, strictly speaking, immoral, excessive corruption could
incur liability. In perhaps the most famous case of Roman corruption, Cicero prose-

cuted the infamous Gaius Verres for "committing many acts of lechery and brutality
against the citizens and allies of Rome, and many crimes against God and man....
[Verres] has illegally taken from Siciliy sums amounting to forty million seterces."
CICERO, Against Verres, in CICERO: SELECTED WORKS 35, 57 (Penguin Classics ed.,

Michael Grant trans., 1971). Verres's crime was not that he had accepted bribes and
extorted from the province he was given to govern, rather it was that he had extorted
so much and so brutally. d. passim. Tellingly, a substantial portion of Cicero's opening narration in the trial focuses not on Verres, but on integrity of the judges in the
extortion court where Verres was being tried (the existence of a special court for
extortions is itself suggestive). Id. at 44-55. Cicero's concern is not his ability to
prove Verres's guilt, but rather with Verres's ability to bribe the entire court. Id. Presumably, such behavior was fairly common. L.H.G. Greenwood, Introduction to I Cic-
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tool that is flexible enough to solve problems of breadth and precise
enough to overcome difficulties of differentiation. Fortunately, courts
can meet this functional need by doing nothing more than remaining
faithful to the formal principle of Morrisette, and rediscovering the
common law's corrupt state of mind.
"Corruptly" can have one of two alternate roles in the context of
bribery, extortion, and illegal gratuities. It can have a central role as a
guarantor against the prosecution of ethically protected campaign activity and extortion victims, against bribery and extortion statutes with
boundless scope, and against serious problems of over- and underbreadth. This is the role properly assigned to it both formally and
functionally, the role consistent with history and common sense. The
alternative, sadly adopted by some courts, assigns corrupt state of
mind a marginal role whose sole purpose is to distinguish between a
bribe and an illegal gratuity whilst color-of-right extortion is left a
strict liability crime.

ERO: THE VERRINE ORATIONS,

at ix-xvi (L.H.G. Greenwood trans., 1989).

